One, on Cao Cao's suppression of the Yellow Turban Uprising
Liu Zhi gradual in the "assessment of comrade Guo Moruo's" for Cao Cao overturned "(Chongqing Teacher's College Journal," No. 1, 1983). In his article, Liu Zhiyuan expressed his opinion that Cao Cao's suppression of the Yellow Turban Revolt did not "succeed the cause of the Yellow Turbans". The main purpose of the Yellow Turbans was to overthrow the Eastern Han regime. Cao Cao, on the other hand, represented the interests of the ruling class of the Eastern Han Dynasty and suppressed the Yellow Turbans with all his might, resulting in the burial of most of the Yellow Turban army north and south of the Yellow River in his hands. He also used intrigue to turn the 300,000 or so remaining Yellow Turbans who had surrendered into an army of landowners who defended the Eastern Han Dynasty. His hands were stained with the blood of the people, and he was the executioner who suppressed the people. It was in this way that he ascended to the stage of history at that time. Zhou Huan, "Revisiting Cao Cao" (Journal of Hebei University, No. 1, 1981), also argues that Cao Cao not only suppressed the Yellow Turbans, but also was not lenient with the aftermath of the Yellow Turbans revolt, the uprising of the Tundun people, which seriously impeded the forward development of society.
Gao Guangfu, on the other hand, argues in his article "Two Problems in the Evaluation of Cao Cao" (Northern Discourse Series, No. 6, 1984) that, as far as Cao Cao's life is concerned, his main activity was not to fight the Yellow Turbans, but to eliminate the herdsmen and unify the north. At the time of his rise to power, the mainstream of the Yellow Turban Revolt had long been extinguished. Although he accepted the Yellow Turbans in Qingzhou, he did not destroy them, but reorganized them to serve his cause of unification. In the future, the target of his crusade was no longer the peasant army, but the separatist forces.
II. Cao Cao and Cao Wei's Tuentian System
Liu Zhijian argued that "Cao Cao's Tuentian was retrograde, for Cao Cao's Tuentian was essentially the same as the well-field system of the Western Zhou feudal lords." Cao Cao openly sang the praises of the well-field system in his poem Du Guan Shan, and Sima Lang had suggested to him that the well-field system be restored. His practice of tuntian was to force the failed insurgent fighters to cultivate the "assets" seized during the suppression of the Yellow Turban Uprising, while at the same time forcibly enlisting free people as tuntian guests under the guise of "recruitment". At that time, "guest" and "slave" were synonymous. Tuantian guest is essentially the Cao Wei regime of the official serfs, no personal freedom, so the guest more escape. From the above can be seen. Cao Cao's cantonment is a retrogression in history and is not to be commended.
Gao Guangfu, on the other hand, believes that Cao Cao's purpose is to obtain military food, annexation of the group, the world. He reunited the failed uprising peasants with the land, solved the problem of displaced people that had existed seriously since the end of the Han Dynasty, and enabled the development of barren land, which was conducive to the construction of water conservancy, and was important for the recovery of the economy at the end of the Han Dynasty. He disagreed with Liu Zhijian's view of the Cao Wei's Tuentian system. He pointed out that "the well-field system emphasized the attachment of laborers to the land, while Cao Cao's tuntian system emphasized the control of laborers by the state", and that the two could not be confused. Moreover, there was also a large number of peasant economies outside of the tundian system, which did not determine the nature of a dynasty's mode of production. Korea Chime, "Tuentian in Cao Wei" (Studies in Chinese Social and Economic History, No. 1, 1982), emphasizes that the Tuentian system of Cao Wei should not be completely rejected by ignoring the historical conditions of the time. Cao Cao practiced cantonization. The system, whose purpose was certainly to bind laborers to agricultural production for the benefit of feudal rule and feudal exploitation, was tremendous (role as before).
Gao Min, in "A Few Questions about the Cao Wei Tuantian System" (Historical Monthly, No. 1, 1981), argued that although the Cao Wei Tuantian system had certain positive effects, it should not be overestimated. He pointed out that under the system of cantonization, the peasant class had to serve and even pay taxes in addition to paying high land rents. They were not benefited in any way by the cantonment system. They were strictly bound to the land and had no personal freedom, so "the people were unhappy and fled"; at the same time, they also opposed Cao Cao's system by means of armed struggle. Li Hu in "a brief discussion of the historical role and status of Cao Wei cantonment" ("Sichuan Normal College Journal") No. 1, 1985), also pointed out that the historical role and status of Cao Wei cantonment should not be overestimated. In his opinion, the cantonment of fields played a great role in supporting the war, resettling the displaced people, and ensuring the financial income of Cao Wei's regime. However, what supported Cao Cao's efforts to overcome the generals and finally unify the north was more importantly the state and county household formation. The real solution to the problem of returning the exiles to the farms also depended on the counties to organize the households.
The Nature of Cao Cao's Regime and Its Class Basis
It was generally believed in the past that Cao Cao, in his efforts to unify the north, made meritocratic decisions, cracked down on the powerful, suppressed mergers, and killed prominent members of his own family, and was the political representative of the commoners or small and medium-sized landowners, and that the class basis of his regime was the small and medium-sized landowners.
Ke Yougen pointed out in his article "Shijin Landlords are the Main Class Base of Cao Cao's Group" (Journal of Xiamen University, No. 2, 1983) that the main class base of Cao Cao's group was the Shijin landlords, not the small and medium-sized landlords. Since the Eastern Han Dynasty, the power of the landowning clans has developed considerably, and despite the Yellow Turban Uprising, it has become y entrenched, and by the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, it had become a pivotal force. In order to win the war and unify the north, Cao Cao adopted a policy and strategy of fighting for and relying on the big families. He enlisted and employed a number of landowners from these families to enrich the ruling institutions at all levels, from central to local, and effectively stabilized the ruling order. Under him, the famous Confucian scholars were his strategic think tanks, and the powerful landowners were the military backbone of his group. Therefore, Cao Cao's group was the political representative of the large landowners, including the commoners and the powerful, mainly the landowners of the Shijiazhuang clan. His regime was mainly to safeguard the interests of these large landowners. Yang Debing's "Trial Discussion of the Nature of Cao Cao's Regime" (Ancient Chinese History Series, 1985, Second Series) holds a similar view. He points out that although Cao Cao chose to use cold people, the core of his regime was the high families, representing the interests of the lineage.
Chieh Zebang, "Refuting the Fallacies of the Gang of Four in Evaluating Cao Cao" (Journal of the Southwest Teacher's College, No. 3, 1979), argued that Cao Cao's ruling group was not just a group of small and medium-sized landowners or powerful landowners, but all landowners, and that it represented the interests of the landowning class as a whole. Cao Cao's advocacy of "meritocracy" was aimed at the entire landowning class, with no distinction between small and medium-sized landowners and powerful landowners. In Cao Cao's group, there were small and medium-sized landowners and powerful landowners in various official positions, and Cao Cao utilized them all. His crackdown on the powerful and the suppression of annexation was only a small concession in response to the peasants' resistance, and was intended to consolidate his rule and stabilize the feudal order.
Fourth, Cao Cao and "Meritocracy"
Cheng Xinwen and Wang Huizhong, in "A Brief Discussion of Cao Cao's "Meritocracy" Employment Route" (Jinyang Xuejian, No. 1, 1981), argued that Cao Cao, in his efforts to unify the north. In order to broaden his class base and eliminate the herdsmen in the midst of a tumultuous war, Cao Cao broke the boundaries of the "ordering the virtuous by position" system of investigation and recruitment since the Eastern Han Dynasty, and put forward the "meritocracy" policy of employing talented people, promoting a large number of talented people in the landowning class and enlisting and utilizing them. Cao Cao's group was blessed with "fierce generals like clouds, and strategic ministers like rain". Cao Cao relied on these men to eventually unify the north.
Li Zegang, in his posthumous work, "Cao Cao's Reversal and Determination of the Case" (JACF, 1981, No. 2), argues that Cao Cao did not really employ people on the basis of merit. Those under Cao Cao's command lived if they obeyed him and died if they disobeyed him. Cao Cao himself killed many talented men. In particular, Xun Yu, whom he called "my Zifang," was forced to die because of his dissenting views. He also killed many of the most talented and intelligent men who had served him well, but were killed because of their doubts about what they had to say. He also set up the "school" secret service organization, spying on the officials and the people, and let the feelings of false accusations, killing the scholar.
Fifth, whether Cao Cao is an outstanding military
Zhong Wen in the "military Cao Cao" ("Knowledge of literature and history" No. 6, 1981), that Cao Cao is "the first-class military when the country died. Cao Cao's life of military service, his eastern and western campaigns, the pacification of the world, the success of the flood, not only in the political unification of the north, but also in military achievements, he has eliminated Lu Bu, Yuan Shu, Han Sui, Yuan Shao and other warlords and forces. He also wrote a commentary on Sun Tzu's Art of War, in which he utilized or supplemented some of its principles of combat command. He was good at applying theories to guide practice and achieved many victories. The failure of the Battle of Red Cliff was mainly due to his complacency. His significant military achievements should be recognized.
Wu Rongzheng's "Evaluation of Cao Cao's Military Talents" (Journal of Xiangtan University, No. 1, 1985) argues that Cao Cao had a certain amount of military talent, but he was not an outstanding military genius, and could not be called a great military man. Cao Cao not only had the intention of surrendering and escaping, but also took many risks in general warfare. In the battles that Cao Cao commanded, such as the Battle of Guandu, the Battle of Red Cliffs, and the Battle of Hanzhong, only the Battle of Guandu was victorious, while the other two battles ended in failure. In the Battle of Guandu, Cao Cao showed a certain amount of military prowess, but the main reason for his victory was not due to his military genius, but rather a fatal weakness within Yuan Shao. Although his commentary on Sun Tzu's Art of War made a contribution, he was unable to use the theory to guide practice. Li Zegang also argues that Cao Cao could only be described as an average military man, not an outstanding one. He certainly won many battles, but he also suffered many defeats. The fact that he was able to unify China was not entirely due to his military victories, which gave him important conditions in his favor, but also had something to do with relocating his master, Liu Xie, to build his capital at Xuchang, and to hold the son of heaven hostage to his vassals.
Sixth, Cao Cao and Jian'an literature
Liu Zhi gradient in the "assessment of comrade Guo Moruo's & lt; for Cao Cao overturned & gt;" and later published "Jian'an literature chronicle" ("Chongqing Teacher's College Journal"), No. 1, 1984), the two articles, Cao Cao's works, "dross is more than the essence of the work", "Cao Cao's work on Jian'an literature. "Cao Cao's negative effects on Jian'an literature are more negative than positive". He points out that the Seven Sons of Jian'an became famous long before they became attached to Cao Cao, and that Cao Cao did not cultivate them. On the contrary, Cao Cao's netting of literati made the Jian'an Seven Sons cultivate and influence Cao Pi's and Cao Zhi's writing; at the same time, it also brought about some unfavorable influences on their writing, which made them detached from reality and far away from life, so that they could only write works that glorified the achievements of the past and the future. Li Zegang also thinks that Cao Cao's role in Jian'an literature should not be overestimated. The Jian'an literary group of the time did not do much to help people's suffering. Although Cao Cao depicted some of the people's suffering in his poems, he himself was the source of the people's suffering. He also brutalized many of the literati he enlisted, such as Kong Rong, who was killed for ridiculing him.
Hu Shihou and others disagreed with Liu Zhijian's views in their article "Cao Cao and Jian'an Literature--And Debate with Comrade Liu Zhijian" (Journal of the Chongqing Teachers' College, No. 1, 1984). They argued that Cao Cao was an outstanding poet and writer, that he had an important position and role in the history of Chinese literature, and that he promoted the positive development of Jian'an literature. Cao Cao emphasized true talent, despised Confucian benevolence and filial piety, and advocated active thinking, which allowed literature to develop independently of scripture. He attached great importance to literature, enlisted and recruited a large number of literati to unite around him, and encouraged them to create. His own poetic and literary style contributed positively to the formation of the "Jian'an style". In addition, he contributed to the reformation of Lefu poetry.
VII. Cao Cao's Thought
Chih Chak-bang believes that Cao Cao's thought was a combination of both the Cowardly and the Legalistic. He adopted the legalist ideology, firstly, to eliminate secession and unify the country, and secondly, to consolidate the dictatorship of the landlord class by strengthening the suppression of the peasant class. He held Confucianism in high esteem. After the unification of the north, he ordered the establishment of schools to spread Confucianism, and his idea of combining Confucianism and Legalism was a traditional means adopted by feudal rulers since the two Han dynasties.
Liu Xuan, "Cao Cao's Political Thought from His Poetry" (Journal of Chongqing Teachers' College, No. 1, 1984), argues that Cao Cao's thought was predominantly Confucian. He avenged his father's death by massacring the people of Xuzhou as an expression of his filial piety. He was not a legalist because he could not abolish the patriarchal system as legalists do, and he opposed the Confucian view of "kinship". He used Confucianism as his standard, both in educational thinking and in the issue of talent.
Wu Qichang, in his article "Cao Cao's Thoughts" (North Series, 1985, No. 1), argues that Cao Cao's thoughts included Confucianism, law, Taoism, military affairs, names, and other schools of thought, and that he was a representative of a variety of schools of thought. When Cao Cao utilized these ideas, he was able to differentiate between primary and secondary aspects according to different situations. In his thought there is a profound contradiction between materialism and idealism. This should be explained in terms of his class and historical limitations. (Liu Anzhi)
In short, Cao Cao can be called a lord of his generation.