Similar to the 3 billion mining projects entrusted by China Chengxin before, there are always some professionals who shout out the view that default will not happen and the market pricing will be distorted, cheering for default, and think that the market should experience default and let the market develop healthily. Many ordinary people may think that once this bond defaults, the market will collapse.
In fact, I think Chaori Sun is just an ordinary company, and Chaori debt is only a bond with a scale of 1 billion in the 20 trillion bond market, so there is no need to make a fuss. China's bond market, after its death, remained open as usual. No big deal.
On the other hand, the default of super-Japanese debt will indeed have a greater impact. In the short term, it will have a big impact on other bonds with lower ratings (many bonds have fallen by more than 2% today), and in the longer term and more broadly, the interest rate differentiation range of future bond issuance will be even larger: the interest rate range of good assets and poor assets may be 5%-8%, and this matter will result in bond issuance of 5%- 10%. In addition, it will also have a certain impact on the work of bond supervision, bond rating companies and other related links: it can only be stricter in the short term. So to put it bluntly, this incident will actually have a certain impact on the development process of the bond market. For example, the private debt launched in recent years may have increased by 30% every year without this incident, but when this incident came out, either the interest rate of issuance rose or the purchasing enthusiasm of the market declined after the issuance of bonds. These effects are pure speculation. Don't spray if there are errors or deviations.
Some people may say: after all, if this company dares to default, will other loss-making companies with poor fundamentals also default? Let's imagine a scene: Mr. Zhang lost money in business, and he didn't have enough money to borrow 8980 yuan interest from his relatives. He just took out 400 yuan from his pocket and gave it to his relatives, and then announced that he was temporarily unable to repay the remaining interest. Neighbors generally believe that this basically declares that Mr. Zhang is going bankrupt and there is no way out. Then Mr. Wang next door lost money in business last year. When he heard about it, he immediately announced to me: Since Mr. Zhang is shameless, so am I. Anyway, I am not the first shameless person in the county! Anyway, he is the first to stimulate your bottom line, and you will understand tolerance if I announce it, right?
Human nature is generally not like this. When a company announces that it is unable to repay the publicly issued debt, I prefer to understand that the company is really powerless, otherwise it will not do so, because when it does, it basically declares the death of the enterprise. Other companies, I think, are naturally proud. One person cherishes his own face, and another person cherishes his own face, which should be independent events. However, people outside definitely don't think so: Wow, Chaori is going to die. As long as it starts, there will be a second solar eclipse and a third solar eclipse. . . I still think whether there will be a second or third candidate among the current "Chaori" candidates. The real breach of contract in the future of Chaori is two relatively independent things, although there are some connections. This correlation mainly lies in the role of local governments. As soon as I see that Shanghai has breached the contract, I won't be the first to have this place, and my attention is not on my side, so do it. However, the major shareholders of companies that may breach the contract, I think, in most cases, may still be unwilling to let their children die like this. Whether to let him die is the result of comprehensive consideration of economic interests and social effects, not whether he is the first.
The "non-default" of bonds and the "rigid redemption" of trusts have always been criticized, but I think the current situation is reasonable. I don't think it should be attributed to the immature mentality of ordinary people. I think the most fundamental reason lies in the lack of social credit system in China. It is precisely because too many people have been cheated and blackmailed that our first reaction to many strange and complicated things is to protect security. In a country where even the elderly are afraid to help themselves fall, we suspect that many things are understandable, and we can only blame those who lack integrity for breaking the integrity system. So you will find that we will simply divide wealth management products and many other things into two dimensions: yes or no, reliable or unreliable. For example, in the United States, the reliability of financial institutions is divided into ten grades from 0- 10. Ordinary people may not come to conclusions easily when they meet unfamiliar financial institutions or products. At first, he will give an intermediate evaluation, and then he will raise and lower the evaluation according to the contact situation. In their evaluation system, there may be less moral judgment on the operators of this institution and more judgment on their professional ability. However, our country is different. When we hear about the money fund, the first thing that comes to mind is whether this thing is deceptive and reliable. I heard about P2P and wondered whether it was reliable or deceptive. So, we are two dimensions of credit: what? It's simple. Speaking of this super-Japanese debt, it is said that the boss of super-Japanese debt has already transferred many assets of the company abroad before-I think so, too, and I guess he will probably do so.
Perhaps, what this society looks like has little to do with us. What I care about is how we can better protect ourselves. As I said at the beginning, ultra-Japanese debt is just a bond. Our life and investment have to go on. So, how can we avoid this unreliable bond?
Let's look at the top ten shareholders of the company: Ni Kailu and Nani. . . . The top ten shareholders who hold more than 50% of the shares are almost all individuals, and most of them are relatives. Such a shareholder structure already shows that this kind of corporate governance has great potential risks. Lending money to such a company seems to have a large component of private lending. A company with a strong personal color, without a big tree behind it, is more likely to be the first bond to default than a state-owned enterprise bond like Shandong Hailong. So, it's important who dad is. There is a reliable father who may come out to help him clean up the mess even if he can't.
If there is a real breach of contract, the regulatory authorities, the Exchange, Pengyuan, the bond rating company, the bond underwriter CITIC Jiantou, and the Tian Jian audit firm may all bear certain responsibilities to some extent. The biggest question of super Japanese debtors is why their performance changed dramatically immediately after issuing bonds, resulting in huge losses. Local governments, which were not responsible originally, often took part in similar matters, as if because of the "face" problem, they always wanted to coordinate all parties to solve it, and they didn't want the first pillar to happen on their own turf.
Judging from the initial public offering, there are only 250 million online offerings, so individual investors can subscribe for 250 million at most. However, in later transactions, it is not known how the chips changed.
The ideal result should be: if the company dies, it will die-if you don't understand the industry, you can only assume. Secondly, in the process of bond issuance, if any institution or individual practices fraud, it should bear due legal responsibility.
Besides, let the storm come more violently. If Chaori finally defaults, low-grade bonds will plunge again.
But out-of-control market sentiment is an opportunity for greedy and far-sighted people.