Priority in the development of heavy industry was the policy of socialist industrialization in the Soviet Union. The establishment of this policy had a profound impact not only on the Soviet Union, but also on a number of other countries.
Background of the emergence
A country has a country's national conditions, a country has a country's historical development conditions. If we leave the national situation at the beginning of socialist industrialization in the USSR and the specific historical conditions of the USSR at that time to talk about this issue, it will not be easy to make clear the policy of the USSR to give priority to the development of heavy industry.
Before the October Revolution, Russia was a backward agricultural country. Industrial products accounted for only l/3 of the country's total products, while agricultural products accounted for 2/3 of the country's total products. in 1914 the industrial products of Tsarist Russia accounted for only 2.46% of the world's industrial output. If calculated on the basis of the average population, the output of industrial products in Russia at that time was on a par with that of backward Spain. Russia was not only economically and technologically dependent on the capitalist countries of industrial development, but also imported a large amount of machinery and equipment from abroad.
The First World War and the ensuing foreign armed intervention and domestic counter-revolutionary rebellions brought the already backward national economy to the brink of collapse. In 1920, the industrial output was only 14% of the pre-war level, and the situation in agriculture was even worse, with the output only 60% of the pre-war level.
The economy was severely damaged, directly affecting the lives of the people. The shutdown of factories and the shortage of food caused unemployment and famine, and in 1920-1921, about 33 million people faced starvation and death in the country.
Obviously, after the crushing of the imperialist armed intervention and the domestic counter-revolutionary rebellion, the first and foremost task facing the party and government of Soviet Russia was to restore the destroyed national economy.
Yet the restoration of the national economy meant only to reach the level of 1913, the level of a still backward country. For the complete "success of the entire emancipation from the yoke of capital and the triumph of socialism" in the new Soviet Russia, it was necessary to "greatly increase the productive forces of society", to achieve industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture.
Lenin once pointed out: "To save Russia, it is not enough to have a good peasant harvest, and it is not enough to have a flourishing light industry, which supplies the peasants with consumer goods - we must also have heavy industry. ...... Without saving heavy industry, without restoring it, we cannot build any industry, and without industry we cannot maintain our position as an independent state at all ......".6 "To save Russia" requires "Save" and "restore" heavy industry, this is Lenin from the analysis of the situation in Russia, analyzing the historical conditions in which Russia came to the conclusion.
Huang Russia is a capitalist failed to develop the backward agricultural country, industry, especially heavy industry is very backward. Until 1928, the proportion between light and heavy industry, heavy industry and light industry only half, while the proportion of agriculture in the national economy is still greater than industry. According to Lenin's idea that "to save Russia" we must "save heavy industry", otherwise "we will not be able to maintain our status as an independent country", the development of heavy industry is obviously not The development of heavy industry was obviously not adapted to the requirements. Moreover, the restored industry, with its weak foundation and backward economy and technology, is an obstacle to the further development of light industry, and, of course, to the transformation and further development of agriculture, where small-scale production predominates. Only by rapidly building up the material and technical basis of socialism in the national economy can the Soviet state be brought out of its backwardness and onto the track of industrial modernization. Heavy industry, on the other hand, is the essence of this basis. Without it it is impossible to carry out the socialist transformation of the whole national economy, including agriculture, and without it it is impossible to equip the backward sectors of the Russian national economy. At the same time, it is only by giving priority to the development of heavy industry that we will not be economically dependent on foreign countries, that we will be able to maintain the political independence of the Soviet state and defend the Soviet system. Otherwise it would have the opposite consequences, because economic dependence inevitably leads to political dependence. "The capitalist countries, which have supplied us with equipment and machinery, can demand of us the abandonment of the basic pillars of the Soviet system."
At that time the Soviet state was surrounded by hostile capitalism. After the crushing of the imperialist armed intervention and the domestic counter-revolutionary rebellion, two tendencies emerged in the capitalist world in its attitude towards the Soviet state: one advocated the continuation of the open policy of armed intervention and "disavowal" of the Soviet state; the other advocated the establishment of normal diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet state. But whether it is the former or the latter, their aim is the subversion of the Soviet regime.
As a matter of fact, the heads of the imperialist powers and the monopoly giants have been playing with the Soviet state at every moment. While attacking the Soviet state by diplomatic and economic means, they are always ready to screw it up by means of war. As soon as they think there is such an opportunity and possibility, they will recklessly pounce on the Soviet state, which is at odds with them. Only by rapidly building up a strong heavy industry, and only if the Soviet Union itself has an extremely solid material basis, will it be able to defeat imperialist diplomatic and economic attacks, to defeat imperialist armed attacks at any time, to maintain its own independent and autonomous development in the midst of a hostile capitalist encirclement, and to build up its national defense forces to a level sufficient to defend the achievements of the Great Revolution. As Lenin said, "...... either perish or catch up with and surpass the advanced countries also in economic terms." "Either to perish, or to go forward with full power, that is how history poses the question."
Then, when we discuss the question of the Soviet Union's prioritization of the development of heavy industry, if we avoid or do not pay sufficient attention to this main point of departure of the Soviet party and government at that time, we will not be able to arrive at the correct conclusions in line with the historical reality.
Theoretical Support
Lenin, in his work On the Grain Tax and in his cooperative program, emphasized the need for socialist industrialization when spelling out his plans for building socialism.
In June 1921, when speaking at the Third Congress of the ****production International about the material basis of socialism and the plan for electrification in Russia, Lenin began by stating that "the only material basis of socialism is the great machine industry which at the same time transforms agriculture, "1 and demanded that "This principle must be concretized" and applied to the construction of socialism in the Soviets.
However, after the end of the civil war, the recovery of the national economy of the USSR did not begin with industrialization, but with agriculture. For at that time the Soviet Union did not yet possess the necessary conditions for the industrialization of the country, namely, in Russia, which had been devastated by the war, there was not yet a vast internal market; in agriculture there was not yet a more developed production of raw materials; and in the countryside it was not yet possible to distribute the necessary amount of agricultural products to supply industry and workers.
In order to develop industry, it is necessary to create these conditions. And this can be done only by starting with agriculture. "To establish the socialist foundations of our economy and to expand industry, we must begin with agriculture," Stalin said on this subject. "For the development of the whole bottom of the national economy depends on agriculture".3 Based on this, it was only at the end of the recovery of the national economy, after agriculture had created certain conditions for the realization of socialist industrialization, that the Soviet Union began to shift its focus to industry. It can be seen that Soviet Russia only brought the question of industrialization to the forefront when agriculture had already developed to a certain extent.
The direction was established
In December 1925, at the 14th Congress of the USSR ****production party, Stalin, on behalf of the Central Committee of the party, put forward the urgent task of transforming the country into an industrial country that was economically independent of the capitalist countries. He emphasized that "the transformation of our country from an agricultural country into an industrial country capable of producing the necessary equipment on its own - this is the essence and basis of our general line." The 14th Party Congress approved the Party's line for the construction of socialist industrialization.
The establishment of the policy of socialist industrialization was determined by its international and domestic conditions, by the fundamental strategic task of building socialism in the USSR. Lenin's series of discourses on building socialism provided a sufficient theoretical basis for the realization of socialist industrialization in the USSR. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that in Soviet Russia it was possible and desirable to build "the socialist basis of our economy".
But where should socialist industrialization begin in the first place? The Soviet party and government made it clear; start with heavy industry, and start with the development of the core of heavy industry, i.e. machine building. Stalin pointed out: "The center of industrialization, the basis of industrialization, is the development of heavy industry (fuel, metals, etc.), and, in the final analysis, the development of the production of the means of production, the development of the country's machine-building industry".
This decision of the Soviet party and government was taken from the national situation of the USSR at that time and from the historical conditions in which the USSR was living at that time. We must fully grasp this point when studying and exploring the question of the Soviet Union's policy of prioritizing the development of heavy industry.
Implementation of the policy
Throughout the process of the implementation of socialist industrialization, the Soviet party and government followed this policy and planned the blueprint for socialist construction. The growth targets for heavy industry set in the plans were high. For example, in the first five-year plan, the ratio of the development rate of heavy industry to that of light industry was 1.85:1, i.e., the growth rate of heavy industry was 241 per cent, while that of light industry was 130 per cent. Later on, in spite of all the difficulties and resistance encountered in the course of implementation, and despite the various mistakes and problems that had arisen, the socialist industrialization, which was based on the policy of giving priority to the development of heavy industry, still achieved gratifying results. In the first two years of industrialization, the socialist part of industry grew from 81 per cent in 1924-1925 to 86 per cent in 1926-1927. In the period from the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan to 1932, the gross industrial output of the USSR nearly tripled in comparison with 1913, the share of industrial output in the national economy as a whole increased from 48 per cent at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan to 70 per cent in 1932, and the share of industry in the manufacture of the means of production rose from 43 per cent in 1928 to 53.3 per cent in 1932. In comparison with the capitalist countries, the USSR has taken the first place in the world in terms of the speed of industrial development, and in terms of: industrial output, the USSR has risen to the second place in the world.
The results of the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan were equally successful. By 1937, the total value of industrial output was 1.2 times greater than in 1932, and almost five times greater than in 1913. Heavy industry accounted for 57.8 per cent of all industry. In comparison with the capitalist world, which in 1937: increased its industrial output by 44.3% over 1913, the USSR in the same period increased by 7.5 times, developing 14.3 times faster than the capitalist world.
It should be pointed out here that although the USSR implemented the policy of giving priority to the development of heavy industry in the construction of socialism, it is unrealistic to say that the USSR has consistently neglected light industry, or even that it has subjectively disregarded the people's deaths and lives to the same extent.
As we all know, due to the implementation of the policy of prioritizing the development of heavy industry, by the end of the twenties, the development of light industry can no longer meet the needs, and even affect the exchange of urban and rural materials and the acquisition of agricultural products. The Soviet party and government recognized this, and has more than once emphasized the accelerated development of light industry, and even put forward the idea of heavy industry and light industry at the same time. 1930 June, Stalin had pointed out: "...... heavy industry we have restored. We just need to keep it going. We can now turn to light industry and accelerate its development. One of the new phenomena in our industrial development is that we now have the possibility of accelerating the development of both heavy and light industry at the same time".8 In this report to the 16th Congress of the U.N.C.L.N., Stalin also emphasized that it was not right to "leave light industry behind".
In fact, during the formulation of the second five-year plan, the Party and government of the USSR had attached great importance to the development of light industry and adjusted the ratio between heavy industry and light industry. The second five-year plan stipulated that during the period 1933-1937, the growth rate of light industry production would be increased from 13.2% during the first five-year plan to 18.5%, while the growth rate of heavy industry production during the same period would be reduced from 40.1% to 14.5%. If the targets set in this plan are followed, light industry will grow much faster than heavy industry during the second five-year plan. The Second Five-Year Plan also provided for a one- to two-fold increase in the level of consumption of the people. Despite the fact that, for various reasons, the results of the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan were still ahead of heavy industry (heavy industry achieved 121.3% of the plan, light industry 85.4%, and agriculture 76.9%), the efforts of the Party and the government of the USSR, and the fact that the Second Five-Year Plan was drawn up with greater emphasis on the development of light industry, resulted in the approximation of the ratios between them. Let us compare the results of the implementation of the two Five-Year Plans: in the first Five-Year Plan, 1928-1932, heavy industry grew by 241 per cent, and in the second Five-Year Plan, 1933-1937, it grew by 140 per cent, and the production of important products and necessities even tripled. Light industry grew by 95%. Light industry grew by 100 per cent (nearly doubled). Certainly from the comparison of these two sets of figures it is not difficult to see that the distance between the rates of development of heavy and light industry during the second Five-Year Plan was shortened as compared with that during the first Five-Year Plan. At the same time, the level of consumption of the people was about doubled. One fact that should not be overlooked is that on January 1, 1935, the Soviet Government announced the abolition of the rationing of grain, flour and hulled grain, and the introduction of "a general and extensive sale of grain and other products in state and cooperative stores." There were various reasons why the results of the second Five-Year Plan were that heavy industry far exceeded the original targets, while light industry and even agriculture failed to meet the planned targets. One of the important reasons was that the international tension caused by Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933 forced the USSR to revise its targets to speed up the development of heavy industry. The completion of the two Five-Year Plans, and the implementation of the first two years of the Third Five-Year Plan program, in the Soviet Union has achieved socialist industrialization.
Completion of the plans
The realization of socialist industrialization, the development of the entire national economy, as well as the large-scale expansion of bases in the eastern part of the USSR, taking into account the growth of the threat of war, ensured the creation of a strong military and economic potential. 1940 in the USSR had already reached 15 million tons of pig iron, 18.3 million tons of steel, 160 million tons of coal, 31 million tons of oil, and commercial grains. reached 31 million tons, commercial grains amounted to 38.3 million tons, and cotton - 2.7 million tons. This was the material base of the Soviet Union before the Great Patriotic War.
In the Great Patriotic War, if there was no industrialization, if there was no heavy industry, how could one imagine that the Soviet people, who were in a very disadvantageous position under the blow of Hitler's surprise attack, could in a short time turn the loss into an initiative and finally achieve a great victory in the Great Patriotic War? Taking into account the growing threat of imperialist war, the Soviet party and government emphasized and accelerated the construction of the industrial base in the eastern region (during the second five-year plan, the eastern region received 33 per cent of the total investment in the national economy and 37 per cent of the total investment in the heavy industry), and the USSR was able to produce 40,000 airplanes, 30,000 tanks, 120,000 cannons and 150,000 machine guns every year during the Patriotic War. It is equally true that the only proletarian dictatorship in the midst of a capitalist siege cannot industrialize at the usual rate. "We are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We should run this distance in less than ten years. Either we can do it, or we are beaten".9 This is what Stalin talked about in his speech "On the Tasks of the Economic Staff". In this same speech, Stalin, tracing the history of the old Russia, which was "often beaten for being backward," emphasized the importance of not "slowing down" "To slow down is to be backward. "To slow down is to lag behind, and those who lag behind are beaten. Stalin's speech was published in February, 1931. From the time of the speech and the arguments, it is not difficult to see that the Soviet party and government to determine the high-speed development of industrial policy is clear and unquestionable.
Discussion of the Correctness of the Policy
In studying and exploring the question of the policy of socialist industrialization in the USSR, a careful review of this history and a careful study of Lenin's, as well as Stalin's, relevant expositions are helpful to the understanding of the question. Without placing the question in the context of the historical environment in which the USSR was living at that time, and without clarifying the starting point of the policy formulated by the Soviet Party and Government, it is impossible to arrive at a correct and comprehensive understanding of the question. Stalin later pointed out on this issue: "The Party knew that the war was approaching and that without heavy industry it would be impossible to defend the country, so it had to get on with the development of heavy industry, and if it was late in doing so, it would fail. The Party remembers Lenin's words: without heavy industry, it will be impossible to maintain the independence of the country; without heavy industry, the Soviet system will perish. That is why we in the ****production party also rejected the 'usual' path of industrialization and began the industrialization of the country with the development of heavy industry".
Stalin's words clarified the fundamental reasons why the Soviet Union, a socialist country under the siege of capitalism, did not follow the "usual" path of industrialization, and summed up the consistent guiding ideology of the Soviet party and government on the implementation of the policy of socialist industrialization in the Soviet Union.
Of course, in the process of industrialization in the USSR, there were serious mistakes.
Because of the over-emphasis on the development of heavy industry in the guiding ideology, in practice, it resulted in a serious imbalance in the ratio of light industry to heavy industry. Stalin and the Soviet Party and government were aware of the serious consequences of this and had taken corresponding measures in practice, but due to a variety of reasons did not receive the desired results, so that it could not be reversed for a long time, within the heavy industry. Within the heavy industry, the first thing to be arranged, of course, is the production of means of production for the service of heavy industry, failing to pay attention to and ensure the production of means of production for the service of light industry and even for agriculture, thus directly affecting the development of light industry as well as agriculture. The socialist industrialization of the USSR, which began with heavy industry, proceeded at a high rate and relied on internal accumulation of capital. Relying on the masses of the people, and in the final analysis mainly on the peasants, the peasants were overburdened, their motivation to produce was dampened, and the development of agriculture remained slow. In the process of socialist industrialization, the people of the Soviet Union, especially the peasants, paid a great price.
As for the Soviet Union at the time of the national situation and the historical conditions of the formulation of socialist industrialization policy, as a "universal law" that is obviously even more wrong.
The serious mistakes made in the course of the implementation of socialist industrialization in the USSR had an adverse effect not only on the USSR, but also on the development of the international ****productivist movement, and they deserve to be seriously summed up. However, in no case should these mistakes lead to a complete denial of the historic role of socialist industrialization in the USSR, which gave priority to the development of heavy industry. It is even more unacceptable to cast doubt on Stalin's subjective motives in pursuing this course.
How to realize socialist industrialization is an important issue in the history of the international ****productivist movement. At that time, the Soviet Union, which was in a complex international and domestic situation, had no example to follow in formulating and implementing this course. Today, it is very meaningful for us to review the path of socialist industrialization taken by the Soviet Union, and to study and explore its positive and negative lessons in a historical and comprehensive manner.