It is generally recognized that the basic nature of damages is to compensate [1]. However, punitive damages as a type of damages have been adopted by the laws of some countries. The legislators of these countries hope that through the organic combination of the compensatory and punitive functions of damages, they can realize the dual purpose of compensation to the victim and economic sanction to the offender. Other countries, on the other hand, are opposed to giving damages a punitive character and refuse to recognize and enforce foreign punitive damages judgments, in addition to refusing to grant punitive damages relief in their own courts. In the Hague Conference on private international law is currently working on the development of the "civil and commercial jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments," the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages judgments has also become one of the focus of the dispute between countries. Due to the United States law on punitive damages provisions have a certain degree of representativeness, this paper mainly around the United States law, combined with the relevant legislation and judicial practice of other countries, on the application of punitive damages judgment, that is, on the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages judgment for preliminary discussion.
I. The concept of punitive damages
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, are money awarded in addition to compensatory or nominal damages, usually because the defendant has committed a particularly aggravated wrongdoing. This type of damages can be traced back to the Code of Hammurabi, according to which if a person stole an animal from a temple, he had to repay the temple thirty times over. The Biblical Book of Exodus, on the other hand, stipulates that if a person steals an ox or a sheep and kills or sells it, he should repay five oxen or four sheep. In addition, the laws of Babylon, the Indian Code of Manu, and the laws of ancient Greece had similar provisions. Punitive damages were initially used to punish and deter certain behaviors rather than to preserve a party's contractual dealings. Therefore, a judgment for damages could only be entered if a party's wrongful act was done willfully or with malice aforethought. Over time, the purpose of punitive damage awards was expanded to cover four additional functions: to deter others from committing the same act; to discourage victims from pursuing self-help remedies; to compensate victims for damages that they could not otherwise recover; and to reimburse plaintiffs for litigation costs that they could not recover.
Many scholars have criticized punitive damages. Opponents of such relief argue that punitive damages are actually unjust because they enrich the plaintiff. In addition, they argue that punitive damages awards can far exceed the maximum criminal penalties for the same conduct, claiming that in some cases punitive damages subject the defendant to double punishment and violate the defendant's due process rights[2]. In Anglo-American law, the standard of proof for criminal penalties is "beyond reasonable doubt," while the standard of proof for civil sanctions is only "preponderance of probability" (balance of probability). The standard of proof for civil sanctions is only "balance of probability" (balance of probability). It is not difficult to see that the civil standard of proof, compared with the criminal standard of proof, is more lenient. "Adding large punitive damages to the relatively low burden of proof often results in confusion, recklessness, and injustice." [3](P602)
Punitive damages have been in the law of common law countries for over 200 years. The common law countries that have adopted this system are: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (England, Wales and Northern Ireland only), and Ireland. For example, in England, Canada and New Zealand, in tort actions such as defamation, assault and battery and unlawful detention, punitive damages may be awarded against the defendant as long as the infringement is particularly serious. Such relief is rarely granted in breach of contract cases [3] (P603-605).
Punitive damages are most widely applied in the United States. Most states allow punitive damages, although the circumstances under which such relief is granted vary (Note: Punitive damages are allowed in the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, and New York). , Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Of course, there are also states that either fundamentally prohibit punitive damages or severely restrict their use; for example, Nebraska does not allow punitive damages awards, and Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Washington allow punitive damages awards only when expressly authorized by law.See John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in International Law. Awarding Punitive Damages in International CommercialArbitrations in the Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson LehmanHutton, Inc.Harvard International Harvard International Law Journal, 1997 vol. 38, No. 1, P. 111.). Many U.S. federal statutes explicitly allow for punitive relief for specific violations, such as the Clayton Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Civil law jurisdictions generally limit the damages recovered in civil actions to an amount that restores a party to the status quo ante. As a result, punitive remedies are usually not available in civil law jurisdictions (Note: There are a few countries in civil law jurisdictions that allow punitive damages awards, such as Norway, Brazil, Poland, Israel, and the Philippines. supranote,p.109.). For example, in France, Germany, and Switzerland, damages sought in tort and contract actions are limited to restoring the parties to the state they would have been in had the injurious event not occurred, or had the contract been properly performed. These countries allow for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages, including moral damages, invasion of privacy, reimbursement of legal fees, etc. However, such non-pecuniary damages are not viewed as punitive in nature, as they are not used to sanction or punish the wrongdoer, but rather to compensate the victim [4]. In most civil law countries, sanctions of a punitive nature can only be awarded in the context of criminal proceedings [5].
The different situation of punitive damages in the two legal systems has specific historical reasons. This difference can be illustrated by a comparison of the way in which trials are conducted in the two legal systems. In England, a jury of local residents with knowledge of the dispute initially decided the outcome of the trial and the amount of damages. Such juries were more inclined than judges to compensate parties whose feelings had been hurt, whose dignity had been impaired or who had been humiliated. This practice has sometimes resulted in damages exceeding the amount of actual damages. Although these non-pecuniary damages are not compensable at common law, English courts have been reluctant to overturn jury awards. They felt that the jury was better informed about the dispute than the judge and better qualified to determine the amount of damages. Over time, this practice became established and punitive damages became a common law remedy.
In contrast, in civil law countries, it is the judge who decides the dispute. Traditionally, judges can only cite statutory provisions as the basis for their decisions, and most of the statutory laws in these countries do not allow for the granting of punitive damages relief.
Probably the first case on punitive damages in a common law country was Wilkes v. Wood. In that case, John Wilkes challenged the legality of a warrant used by a government agency to search his house. In his instructions to the jury, the judge specifically authorized an award of punitive damages to punish the defendant and to serve as a warning against future wrongdoing. The judge observed that "damages are used not only to compensate the victim, but also as a punishment for the offense, to avoid similar suits in the future, and as evidence of the jury's abhorrence of that suit."[6] The subsequent case of Huckle v. Money further cemented the status of punitive damages. Despite the existence of these two well-known precedents, which are often cited in English law, it was not until 1964 that the House of Lords explicitly handed down a punitive damages judgment in Rookes v. Barnard and confirmed the power of the English courts to issue punitive damages judgments[7].
Two, punitive damages in U.S. law
In the U.S. legal system, punitive damages is a highly controversial issue. Early American jurisprudence was heavily influenced by English common law, and some judges tended to follow the examples set by cases such as Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money. Questions about the attributes of punitive damages became a traditional point of contention in nineteenth-century American law. Simon Greenleaf in his book "the law of evidence" pointed out that: "damages as a kind of compensation or compensation for the plaintiff actually suffered by the defendant's injury. They should be exactly equal to the injury suffered, neither more nor less ......" [8]. Theodore Sedgwick, on the other hand, argues that while the law is usually concerned with compensation, the jury can award so-called punitive or exemplary damages when there is fraud, malice, gross negligence, or duress. It grants damages not only to compensate the victim but also to punish the offender [9]. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted Sedgwick's view in 1852 in the case of Day v. Woodsworth. In subsequent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the power of the jury to award punitive damages.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court's May 1996 decision in BMW North America, Inc. v. Gower also demonstrated to some extent that U.S. courts have taken a restrictive position on punitive damages. In that case, Mr. Gower purchased a BMW car in 1990 for $40,000 USD. Later, he discovered that the car had been repainted to repair the damage it had sustained during ocean transportation. However, BMW North America did not inform Mr. Gower of this fact when it sold the car. Mr. Gower then filed suit against BMW North America in Alabama state court. The jury in the case first determined that BMW North America's repairs to the car Mr. Gower purchased devalued it by $4,000, and then awarded BMW North America $4 million in punitive damages based on the fact that nearly 1,000 other customers across the country had purchased repainted BMWs over the course of 10 years. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the jury's award, but cut the amount of punitive damages therein in half. After the case was ultimately appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Supreme Court, after a trial, ruled by a slim 5-4 majority that the Alabama Supreme Court's $2 million punitive damages award was grossly excessive and did not comply with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The majority opinion in the decision held that the power of states to impose liability for interstate automobile sales is subject to federal authority regarding interstate commerce and to the interests of other states. Accordingly, state courts may only impose punitive damages for conduct committed within the state in which the action is brought. Under this standard, state courts may no longer consider the effects of the defendant's conduct in other states when awarding punitive damages [10].
Despite the repeated affirmation of punitive damages, there is often disagreement among U.S. courts and scholars about the rationale behind them. U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in recent years has addressed the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. Some have argued that punitive damages often depend on a jury's favorable or unfavorable opinion of the defendant; others have argued that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that punitive damages awards are largely outside the bounds of reasonableness and that reform of federal and state punitive damages laws is warranted. Regardless of the comments made about punitive damages, however, there have been a number of changes in the law on the subject up and down the United States. The United States Congress passed a reform bill on product liability law in 1996, which required that all punitive damages be proved by persuasive evidence that the defendant's intentional gross indifference to the rights or safety of others was the primary cause of the injury; and limited punitive damages to twice the total economic loss or $250,000 dollars. However, the bill was vetoed by President Clinton on May 2, 1996, and the House of Representatives failed to override the President's veto.
In the case of U.S. states, punitive damages are also subject to additional restrictions, including (1) the use of a higher standard of proof; (2) legislation requiring that the punitive damages portion of the judgment be paid to the state, not to the plaintiff; (3) limitations on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded; and (4) a complete ban on punitive damages awards. The first of these approaches, the most widely adopted, requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant's liability by clear and convincing evidence, replacing the original "preponderance of the evidence" standard. In sum, at least 40 states in the U.S. have imposed varying degrees of restrictions on punitive damages awards over the past decade.
Now, the National Commission on Uniform State Laws is working on a Model Punitive Damages Act. The purpose of the Model Act is to harmonize state practice with respect to punitive damages. Rather than authorizing states to make punitive damages awards, the Model Act governs punitive damages awards after such awards have been made by the states under common law or otherwise. The Act contains clear provisions on how trial and appellate courts are to judicially review jury awards of punitive damages, the parties' burdens of proof, and so forth.
III. Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Awards Abroad
A decision of the German Federal Supreme Court on June 4, 1992, demonstrates Germany's attitude toward U.S. punitive damages law. The American plaintiffs in a sexual abuse case sought German enforcement of a judgment rendered by a California state court. The judgment covered expended medical expenses, future medical expenses, social welfare placement fees, pain and suffering damages, and punitive damages. The judgment debtor pointed out that, according to section 38 of the German Civil Law Enforcement Act, German citizens could not claim higher damages than those provided for under German law for torts committed abroad. Since the judgment included punitive damages, the judgment debtor argued that the German Supreme Court should refuse to enforce the judgment on the basis of section 328, paragraph 1, subparagraph 4, of the German Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that the judgment was contrary to German public policy. The German Supreme Court held that, under German law, damages in tort cases could only be of a compensatory nature; whereas sanctions of a punitive nature could only be imposed by a criminal court. The enforcement of a judgment containing punitive damages would be contrary to German public * * * policy. Therefore, the German Supreme Court categorically refused to enforce the damages part of the judgment of the California State Court. At the same time, however, the German Supreme Court noted that the refusal to enforce punitive damages does not prevent the enforcement of other enforceable portions of the judgment.
Japanese courts have taken a position similar to that of the German courts with respect to punitive damages awards in the U.S. In 1993, the Tokyo High Court refused to enforce a U.S. judgment containing punitive damages. In that case, the United States Superior Court of the State of California issued a judgment in favor of a partnership in the State of Oregon, United States of America, and against a Japanese company and the directors of its subsidiary in the State of California, based on a lease and construction contract. According to the judgment, the Japanese company and the directors of its subsidiary were liable for compensatory damages in the amount of $425,251, litigation costs in the amount of $40,104.71, and the Japanese company was also liable for punitive damages in the amount of $1,125,000. The prevailing party filed a lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court seeking enforcement of the judgment by Nippon under Article 200 of the Civil Procedure Code of Japan. After hearing the action, the Tokyo District Court held that enforcement of a foreign judgment containing punitive damages could not be refused solely on the ground that there was no provision for punitive damages in the Japanese legal system or that its purpose was criminal in nature. At the same time, however, the court noted that whether enforcement of a foreign judgment could be refused on the ground that it violated the Japanese public order depended on whether the foreign proceedings violated the basic principles of the Japanese civil procedure system. Since the written findings of fact against the Japanese company in the judgment of the California State Court could not serve as a sufficient basis for the award of punitive damages against it, the award of punitive damages made by the California High Court was based on deliberate concealment and misrepresentation of the true facts, which violated the basic principles of the Japanese civil procedure system. Accordingly, the Tokyo District Court refused to enforce the judgment on the ground that it violated the Japanese public order. The practice of the Tokyo District Court does not completely preclude enforcement of punitive damages judgments in U.S. courts. However, when the United States party appealed the Tokyo District Court's decision to the Tokyo High Court, the Tokyo High Court held that the punitive damages judgment was criminal in nature, not civil, and therefore could not be enforced. At the 1996 meeting of the Special Committee of the Hague Conference on Private International Law for the elaboration of a Convention on Jurisdiction and Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, the representative of Japan pointed out that, since punitive damages in the United States are very different from compensatory damages in Japan's civil law relating to torts and punitive damages of a criminal nature are similar to fines in Japan, a judgment for punitive damages in the United States Therefore, a judgment for punitive damages in the U.S. is not a "foreign judgment" of a civil nature under Article 200 of the Civil Procedure Law and Article 24 of the Civil Execution Law of Japan[11]. This position of the Japanese representative is the same as the approach taken by the Tokyo High Court.
In Canada, although a system of punitive damages also exists in the law, it is only in rare circumstances that a Canadian court may award punitive damages, and the amount of punitive damages is extremely limited. In both the common law provinces of Canada and Quebec, punitive damages are an exceptional remedy. A court may award punitive damages only if the defendant's wrongdoing is so serious that it offends the solemnity of the court and ordinary and aggravated damages are insufficient for punitive and exemplary purposes. Therefore, Canada has always taken a negative attitude towards the overly broad punitive damages awards in the United States. For example, in the 1994 case of Stoddard v. Arcopress Manufacturing Company, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, while enforcing a punitive damages award by a United States court in Connecticut, the trial judge in the case noted that the amount of non-pecuniary damages awarded in the United States exceeded Canada's limits on such awards by a factor of several. If the parties had objected to the enforcement of the judgment on the basis of public *** policy, the court would have limited or refused to enforce the punitive damages award in the United States court.
Punitive damages are recognized by law in Australia, but they are mostly limited to international tort cases. Some states have abolished punitive damages in cases such as traffic accidents and industrial personal injury cases. Foreign judgments containing doubled damages are not enforceable because of their criminal character, either under common law or under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991. In addition, Australia's antitrust laws contain specific provisions prohibiting or limiting double damages. For example, Australia's Foreign Proceedings (Excessive Jurisdiction) Act 1984 was enacted primarily in response to specific issues raised by the United States judgment in the Westinghouse case. Under the Act, the Attorney-General of Australia may prohibit the enforcement of a double damages award made in a foreign antitrust proceeding, either in full or in excess of the limit. Although foreign judgments containing elements of punitive damages may in principle be recognized in specific circumstances, the enforcement of punitive damages judgments will be prohibited by the relevant Australian authorities in antitrust matters relating to the 1984 Act referred to above.
In 1989, the Civil Court of Basel, Switzerland, recognized and enforced a United States court judgment containing punitive damages. A Swiss company and an American company were in litigation over a contractual dispute in the United States Federal Court for the Northern District of California. The U.S. company was awarded $50,000 in punitive damages in addition to $120,000 in compensatory damages. When the U.S. company applied for enforcement of the judgment in a Swiss court, the Swiss company argued that the punitive damages portion of the judgment should not be enforced on the grounds that the punitive damages constituted a criminal legal validity; and that enforcement of the judgment would be a violation of the Swiss public **** order. The Swiss Civil Court of Basel held that criminal law is founded on the punitive power of the State, whereas civil law is designed to protect and realize the rights of private parties. Since civil law compensatory damages may also legitimately be used to impose punishment, the civil law character of such relief cannot be denied. In that case, punitive damages were awarded to a private party rather than to the state, and therefore it did not rely on the state's power to punish in the criminal legal system.
IV. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Punitive Damages Awards in the United States
In fact, the United States' attitude toward punitive damages relief in other countries is not far removed from the attitude of other countries toward punitive damages relief in the United States. In Philippines *** and State v. Westinghouse Power Company, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had interfered with the duty of good faith owed by Marcos to the Filipino public by paying bribes to former Philippine President Marcos in order to obtain a particular contract. As a result, the plaintiff filed a claim for punitive damages under Philippine law in the United States District Court for the Federal District of New Jersey. The trial judge in the case held that the courts of any country do not enforce the criminal laws of a foreign country. While a claim cannot be made criminal merely because the government seeks to enforce it, such a punitive measure is criminal if the complaint is brought in the name of the state and the fine recovered is to be paid into the state treasury.
Courts in the United States have also refused to enforce foreign judgments for punitive damages. In Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwere Co., a U.S. court refused to enforce the punitive portion of an ICC arbitration award on the grounds that punitive damages violated the most basic notions of morality and justice (in Georgia). In that case, the ICC arbitrator, applying French law, awarded a 5% increase in interest rates every two months from the date of the award if a party failed to pay the award. The United States court held that the French law violated the public * * * policy of the State of Georgia and therefore refused to enforce the punitive interest rate provision of the arbitration award.
V. International coordination of recognition and enforcement of punitive damages
From the above, for the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages judgment, countries to the public **** policy reservations to be resolved. However, the use of public *** policy reservation is not enough to solve the problem completely. In 1992, the United States delegation proposed to the Hague Conference on Private International Law that a new global convention on jurisdiction and mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be developed. That proposal was immediately echoed by many States. In the same year, the Hague Conference on Private International Law organized a working session to evaluate the United States delegation's proposal, and in May 1993, the seventeenth General Assembly of the Hague Conference on Private International Law decided to place the issue on the organization's working agenda. Subsequently, the Hague Conference on Private International Law held three meetings of the Special Commission in 1994, 1996 and 1997 to discuss the main issues to be resolved in the elaboration of the Convention, and the 18th Assembly of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1996 decided to place the elaboration of the Convention on the agenda of the 19th Diplomatic Conference in 2000. As mentioned earlier, the question of the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages awards is addressed in the Convention, which is in the process of being elaborated. At the 1996 session of the Special Committee, the representative of the United States pointed out that, based on the indications of the 1996 United States Federal Supreme Court decision in BMW North America, Inc. v. Gower, and a careful study of United States state jurisprudence, it was clear that virtually all awards of punitive damages at first instance had been reduced or invalidated on appeal. This augurs well for a future in which excessive damage awards will not be a problem. However, some States are skeptical of this optimistic view, since the Federal Supreme Court's decision, which the representative of the United States claimed was adopted only by a narrow majority of 5 to 4, and even among the majority of the judges, the reasoning they held differed. Accordingly, the States concerned continued to suggest that the future Convention on Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters should contain specific restrictive provisions on the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages judgments. The States concerned were of the view that, in formulating the relevant restrictive provisions, it was important to distinguish between punitive damages, multiple damages and excessive damages and to treat them differently. Of these, excessive damages are compensatory damages, and in the case of judgments containing excessive damages, some States have suggested that a provision similar to that contained in the aforementioned Anglo-American draft treaty on the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments be included in the convention. The draft provided that the court against which recognition and enforcement was sought could recognize and enforce only a lesser amount of the judgment if the respondent established that the amount of damages awarded by the court of first instance was substantially greater than the amount that should have been awarded on the basis of the relevant law and facts. However, it was also pointed out that such a provision would not avoid a review of the merits of the case, which would be incompatible with the purposes of the Convention. Punitive damages are non-compensatory damages, while multiple damages are a special type of punitive damages, which in practice are mostly found in the antitrust field. Some States have argued that the Convention could exclude the recognition and enforcement of such awards by explicitly providing that punitive or multiple damages do not fall within the scope of "civil and commercial matters". However, this view was also rejected by the majority of States, since some States considered punitive or multiple damages to be civil in nature; moreover, it was clearly unreasonable to exclude the recognition and enforcement of judgments containing punitive damages, which would result in other elements of such judgments not being recognized and enforced either. For this reason, some States have suggested that judgments containing such damages should be partially enforced, i.e., that punitive damages may not be recognized and enforced.
The question of the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages was a difficult one during the drafting of the Convention, and the draft Convention provisionally adopted by the Special Committee on 18 June 1999 contained a specific provision on the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages in article 31, which provided for the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages judgments. The article, which refers to punitive and excessive damages collectively as non-compensatory damages, provides that:
"I. A judgement for non-compensatory damages, including a judgement for punitive damages, shall be recognized by the requested State if a similar judgement for damages could have been rendered in the requested State.
II. Recognition of an award of damages in a proceeding in the State of the original judgment may be limited to a lesser amount if, through proceedings in which the creditor is given an opportunity to be heard, the debtor can establish to the requested court that the award of damages in the proceeding in the State of the original judgment would have been grossly excessive.
In any event, the requested court may not recognize a judgment for an amount less than the amount that could have been awarded in the requested State in the same circumstances as in the State of the original judgment.
Thirdly, in applying the provisions of the first or second paragraph, the requested court shall consider whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the original judgment court would have enabled the recovery of costs and expenses relating to the proceedings."
From the above provisions, it can be found that the draft convention affirms the recognition and enforcement of punitive damages judgments in principle, but at the same time attaches certain restrictive conditions. Since countries have not yet reached a final *** understanding on this issue, the above provisions of the draft convention will need to be discussed at the 19th Diplomatic Conference of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the year 2000. We can only wait and see what the outcome will be.
Sixth, our country should take a position on this issue
In China's academic circles, as to whether the damages can be punitive, there are two different views. One point of view that damages should be both compensatory and punitive [12]; Another point of view that compensatory is the general attribute of damages, punitive only applies to the exception [13]. However, the provisions on punitive damages have been reflected in China's legislation. Article 49 of China's Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests is about punitive damages. The article provides that "If the operator provides goods or services with fraudulent behavior, he shall increase the compensation for the loss suffered by the consumer in accordance with the consumer's request, and the amount of the increased compensation shall be double the price of the goods purchased by the consumer or the cost of the service received." This provision, is a breakthrough in our previous compensation for actual losses principle, indicating that China has legislatively recognized punitive damages [14]. Therefore, judgments made by courts in China based on such laws can be regarded as punitive damages judgments. In foreign-related cases, such punitive damages judgments may need to be enforced abroad, thus inevitably generating the problem of extraterritorial recognition and enforcement of judgments. On the other hand, in judicial practice, our courts may also be requested to recognize and enforce foreign punitive damages judgments. In this regard, China's legislative and judicial level, what position should be taken?
China's current legal provisions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments do not explicitly exclude the recognition and enforcement of foreign punitive damages judgments. Generally speaking, if the foreign judgment does not violate the basic principles of Chinese law, or does not jeopardize China's national sovereignty, security and social **** interests, the people's court may rule to recognize its validity and issue a writ of execution. This raises the question of whether a foreign punitive damages judgment violates the basic principles of Chinese law. In our civil law already exists in the punitive damages provisions, we can still regard the foreign punitive damages judgment as a criminal judgment and refused to recognize and enforce? These questions urgently need to be answered in our legislation and judicial practice. At present, as a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the relevant departments of our country are also actively participating in the drafting of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. Taking this opportunity, we should re-examine our legal provisions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments to make up for the deficiencies and perfect them. This article does not intend to give a clear answer to the above questions, look forward to a more in-depth discussion.