In carrying out the supervision and inspection work of expanding domestic demand, the bidding link in the process of project construction management is more prominent. To this end, the Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision in conjunction with the Municipal Development and Reform Commission, the Municipal Housing and Construction Commission and other departments to form a joint research group to carry out more than a month of the bidding market supervision research, aimed at exploring the establishment of a unified and open, standardized supervision and regulation, competition and orderly bidding administrative supervision system, to ensure that the quality of the project safety, financial security, personnel safety.
First, the basic situation and effectiveness
(a) the rapid development of the bidding industry
The national "Bidding Law" and "Beijing Bidding Regulations" since the implementation of the city's bidding has been by the construction projects, government procurement extended to the land grant, property rights transactions, medical equipment and pharmaceutical procurement and many other areas, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing, the city of Beijing and the city of Beijing. All kinds of bidding intermediary agencies are developing rapidly. At present, the city is preparing to set up a bidding association, bidding has become an independent industry in line with the development of the market economy.
(2) The pattern of tangible market has begun to form
With the continuous expansion of the scale of government investment, the city has gradually formed a more complete tangible construction market, in which the Municipal Housing and Urban-Rural Development Commission has a market at the municipal level, that is, the Beijing Municipal Construction Engineering Contracting and Contracting Transaction Center, and the 15 districts, counties, and the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Zone has 16 transaction centers for the construction, supervision, supervision, and management of the construction projects for the building and municipal construction projects, as well as the construction and supervision of the projects. There are 16 trading centers in 15 districts and counties and Beijing Economic and Technological Development Zone, providing services for construction, supervision, labor subcontracting and equipment and material procurement bidding and tendering activities for housing construction and municipal construction projects. The Municipal Transportation Commission has a Beijing Transportation Construction Bidding and Tendering Service Center to provide services for the bidding and tendering activities for the implementation of transportation infrastructure projects; The Municipal Water Affairs Bureau and the Municipal Landscaping and Greening Bureau have a water conservancy project construction project bidding and tendering market and a landscaping and greening service center, respectively, to provide services for water conservancy project and landscaping and greening construction project bidding and tendering activities; the Municipal Land Bureau has a land trading center, and the 10 districts and counties have 10 land trading sub-centers, to provide services for the bidding and tendering activities for the granting of state-owned land use rights for building construction and for the right to first-level development of land; Beijing Electric Power Company (BEPC) has 2 markets, namely the Electric Power Engineering Market Resource Platform and the Material Resource Platform, which provide services for all electric power projects managed by BEPC and bulk electric power engineering material procurement and bidding activities, etc. The use of advanced information technology and equipment in each physical market provides a hardware environment that ensures the openness, transparency and effective supervision of bidding activities.
(C) bidding activities effectively
According to incomplete statistics, -, Beijing *** for construction general contracting bidding projects (including direct contracting) 9025, the winning bid price of 353.28 billion yuan; professional bidding 8659, the winning bid price of 36.641 billion yuan; labor bidding 15637, the winning bid price of 29.26 billion billion; 1,488 tenders for materials and equipment, with a winning bid of 8.18 billion yuan. Effective bidding activities, saving money, standardize the city's construction market order, to ensure the smooth implementation of the Olympic Games and other key projects.
Despite the rapid development of the bidding business, the results are obvious, but due to the current bidding regulatory system has lagged behind the rapid development of the situation, resulting in frequent problems in the field of bidding, corruption cases are still at a high level.
Second, the regulatory deficiencies and system causes
The current administrative regulatory system of bidding, is to sub-industry supervision is the main, comprehensive supervision is supplemented by the system. In the early stage of implementation, to promote the development of the bidding market has played a positive role, but with the continuous development and changes in the field of bidding, its shortcomings are increasingly prominent. Mainly in:
(a) the same body supervision, the lack of checks and balances
In the current system, the government investment bidding and comprehensive supervision function is mainly reflected in the development and reform departments of the approval of the project bidding program, and the bidding of the specific implementation and supervision by the business, construction, water conservancy, transportation, land and finance and other departments in accordance with their respective administrative authority to set. This system of placing the competent authorities as both "athletes" and "referees" objectively creates conditions for the competent authorities to pursue the maximization of departmental interests and the protection of vested interests, coupled with the water conservancy, transportation, government procurement, land and other trades and industrial projects, the competent authorities are both the "players" and "referees". The first is that the government is not only the only one who has the right to bid, but also to manage and supervise the bidding activities of the industry, which objectively leaves room for rent-seeking power.
(B) decentralized law enforcement, supervision and lack of
Due to the system caused by the departmental decentralized supervision mode, the formation of the bidding supervision of the multiple management, fragmentation of the situation, which directly led to the regulatory gap. First, some owners and authorities to underreporting more construction, dismemberment of the project, the whole into zero, part of the tender to avoid bidding. Secondly, some owners in the bidding with the bidders, agents collude with each other to engage in false bidding, bid-rigging, and even engage in off-site transactions such as yin and yang contracts, due to decentralized law enforcement, the process of the lack of punishment of illegal acts, seriously disrupting the market order, and nourish the occurrence of corruption in the field of engineering and construction. The Bi Yuxi case is an example of the lack of supervision. Third, the lack of supervision of intermediary agencies. At present, the management of intermediary agencies, heavy approval, light management, qualification approval is a multi-tier situation, some intermediary agencies at the same time with more than ten agency qualifications. In practice, individual intermediary agency often occurs after the violation of the operation of the credibility of the qualification and business without any impact on the strange phenomenon. Due to the lack of government supervision, such phenomena occur neither documented nor punished, seriously disrupting the bidding market order. During the research period, the research group organized and convened part of the bidding agency and some state-owned bidding enterprise symposium. From the feedback, most of the current bidding agencies and state-owned enterprises, the administrative supervision of the bidding status is not satisfied.
(C) the rules are not uniform, open and transparent weak
Decentralized regulatory model, which directly leads to the weakening of the openness and transparency of information. First, the current bidding information dissemination platform is not unified. Although the Municipal Development and Reform Commission has set up the "Beijing Bidding Information Platform", the research found that some departments have their own designated publication
register the phenomenon of bidding information release media. This is contrary to the city's regulations . Behavior, not only to the bidders caused by the inconvenience of access to information, but also the unified release of information on the openness and transparency, the maintenance of the interests of all parties in the market for the interests of open, fair and just competition formed an obstacle. Secondly, the problem of bid evaluation expert pool is still prominent. Although the Municipal Development and Reform Commission and the Municipal Personnel Bureau formulated the "Beijing bid evaluation expert database and bid evaluation expert management approach", requiring the establishment of the city's unified Beijing bid evaluation expert database, strict management of experts, but the previous sub-departmental establishment
and management of the expert database of the institutional impact still exists, leading directly to the quality of the experts are uneven, the problem of the situation of prone to hair more often. Third, the professional market operating rules are not consistent. Some illegally set up bidding and tendering of administrative licensing, qualification verification, registration and other provisions contradicting the "Bidding and Tendering Law"; some through discriminatory provisions to exclude or limit the bidding of foreign enterprises, such as industry monopoly and regional blockade provisions.
(D) market segmentation, resource **** enjoyment of poor
First, the department on the strip to run the market often decentralized professional market resulting in a large number of manpower, material resources, duplication of waste, while some of the lack of standardized and fixed trading venues. Many projects, especially transportation, water conservancy, landscaping and other projects bidding activities, trading venues, mobility, arbitrariness is very large, the limited regulatory power is difficult to implement effective supervision, resulting in the competent authorities to regulate the blind spot, coupled with the bidding activities are relatively more hidden, objectively bidding for violations of the law to provide the conditions. Secondly, the block on the urban areas of each office city often such as tangible building and construction market, the current Beijing Municipality formed a city construction project contracting trading center and various districts and counties have construction project contracting trading center coexisting but not subordinate to each other's pattern.
(E) public **** power operation is not standardized
First, the power is not far from the market under the current bidding system, the government is still the largest owner to some extent. Government owners or their directly commissioned agents in the organization of bidding, the preparation of pre-qualification documents and bidding documents and bid evaluation methods, acceptance of tender registration, qualification examination, the organization of the bid opening and evaluation of bids, the designation of the bidder's representative to participate in the evaluation of bids and other processes, the owner's power to seek rent in a large space. For example, laws and regulations, the state and the people's governments of autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government to determine the key construction projects, as well as all the use of state-owned capital investment or state-funded investment in a controlling or dominant position in the construction projects, should be open tender. And in the actual bidding, often with various reasons to avoid public bidding, such as the project technology is complex, involving national security, secrets and other reasons to invite bidding; some projects as a political task and performance engineering, to speed up the development of the reasons for the implementation of invitations to tender; and then, such as representatives of the bidders, although only a minority of the bid evaluation committee, but often act as the head of the bid evaluation committee, with the tendency of the speech and evaluation often Around other bid evaluation experts bid evaluation behavior. Secondly, cadres are not away from corruption. A small number of leading cadres have a poor concept of the legal system, the administration of the law and speed up the economic development of the opposition, and even directly involved in or illegally intervene in the bidding activities, authorizing and instructing subordinate owners to find ways to contract the project to its designated bidders, individual leading cadres to use their power for personal gain, and their own and children of relatives to seek illegal benefits.
Three countermeasures
In accordance with the principle of government establishment, standardized management, public **** service, fair trade, adhere to the separation of government affairs, the separation of government and enterprises, to break the regional blockade and monopoly of the industry, integration and utilization of various types of tangible building and construction market resources, and gradually establish a unified and standardized tangible market of the engineering construction in accordance with the establishment of a sound In accordance with the establishment of a sound decision-making power, the implementation of the power to supervise the power structure and operation mechanism of both mutual coordination and mutual constraints of the requirements of the reform of the current bidding and investment regulatory system should follow the principles and achieve the goal.
First, the separation of project administration and supervision and enforcement powers. Under the framework of the current system, the competent authorities such as the Development and Reform Commission, finance, transportation, construction, water conservancy, land and other project authorities continue to bear the responsibility of approving the project bidding program and inspection, the respective regulatory authority to a unified integrated regulatory department to implement the solution to the "nine dragons rule the water", all tube are not care about the problem.
Secondly, the right to formulate policies and supervise and enforce the right to separate. By the municipal government to set up a special work management committee to assume the responsibility of guiding and coordinating the bidding, the establishment of a special regulatory body to assume the responsibility of the whole process of supervision of the bidding market. Realize the "five unification" in the operation of the bidding market: namely, the unified formulation of relevant supporting regulations and supervision rules for bidding; a unified information dissemination platform; a unified pool of experts for evaluating bids; a unified industry association and credit evaluation system; and a unified platform for accepting complaints and queries. To solve the problem of the lack of government supervision of the bidding market misplaced.
Third, enhance the government service function. Cancellation of the existing construction project contracting trading center, transportation construction bidding service center, water conservancy project construction project bidding market and other tangible market all administrative fees, in the unified information dissemination platform, the unified release of bidding announcement, bidding pre-qualification announcement, the winning bid publicity and illegal acts, etc., to improve the open transparency of the market competition, to solve the problem of asymmetry of information.