Lament before the sinking of the German camera manufacturing ship

In my bookcase has been placed a few with ZEISSIKONGVOIGTLANDER (ZEISSIKON FOLLENDER) trademark 135 film cameras. In this small nameplate, ZEISSIKON in the upper, VOIGTLANDER in the lower, separated by a horizontal line, the dense 20 capital letters occupy almost all the space of the logo, neither eye-catching nor lack of aesthetic (Figure 1), it is this piece of small, not beautiful plate records the history of the mid-century between the two German camera makers of a period of sadness and joy. It is the story of a company's struggle for survival, and an important part of the story of the sinking of the German camera manufacturing ship.

In the first half of the last century, Germany's four largest camera manufacturers each dominated one side, they have their own areas of specialization, but also overlap with each other and fiercely contested market. Ernst leitz company (Ernst leitz Wetzlar, hereinafter referred to as leitz) business direction is the most stable, in addition to telescopes and microscopes and other optical instruments, it has been committed to 135 specifications of the film small side camera development and manufacturing, Leica (Leica) camera almost become the standard specification of the 135 film machine. Rollei company (Rollei-Werke Franke & Heidecke hereinafter referred to as Rollei) is fully committed to creating a medium format film double lens reflex camera, Rollei Flex (Rolleiflex) camera is the camera manufacturers around the world competing for imitation. Voigtlander & Sohn A.G. (hereinafter referred to as Voigtlander) has the widest range of businesses, including film and chemical materials in addition to optical instruments, and has been developing cameras of various specifications. Zeiss Ikon A.G. (hereinafter referred to as Zeiss Ikon) was established in 1926, but its five founding companies have a long history. Its core brand is Carl Zeiss, and it promotes a variety of lenses in addition to a wide range of optical instruments. In terms of camera manufacturing, both Frenda and Zeiss Ikon were able to design and produce cameras of all sizes, and were rivals for many years.

After the war, the German camera manufacturing industry after a full recovery, although experienced a brief boom, but due to the soaring prices of raw materials and rising labor costs, and other reasons, soon appeared a large loss situation. Frenda is no exception, its major shareholder Scheering company decided to get rid of this loss-making burden, back to the main chemical products of the old way. 1956 Scheering company made the decision to sell Frenda and announced to the public. American Kodak (Kodak) and some Japanese companies were very interested in this, because Frenda is, after all, the oldest photographic equipment company, which has accumulated a wealth of experience in the manufacture of cameras and lenses, but also gathered a number of excellent designers and skilled workers, Frenda's brand has a high degree of visibility and good reputation. Just when these foreign companies are ready to jump on the acquisition of this famous brand, they did not notice that the German local brand Zeiss Ikon has long been ready to fight for.

After the Second World War, Zeiss Ikon was looking for a chance to take over Vorlunda, and after buying 20% of Vorlunda's shares at the end of the 1940s, the company was not able to realize its goal of a full takeover, and now it is certainly not going to let go of this opportunity easily. 1956 saw Zeiss Ikon make another big move to beat out its foreign rivals and buy 89.7% of Vorlunda. In 1956, Zeiss Ikon struck again, defeating its foreign rivals and buying 89.7% of the shares of Vorlunda, becoming the absolute controlling shareholder of Vorlunda. This completed the plan to annex the competitor completely. Frenda has since become a branch of Zeiss Ikon, two famous German camera brands in the market fight to the death from now on ceased.

In the next ten years, Zeiss Ikon gave enough respect and tolerance to Frenda, and retained the original Frenda design team and manufacturing workers to the greatest extent possible. The design concept of Voronta products was recognized and the remaining factory production lines were continued. The design, production and sales management teams remained relatively independent and were free to set their own direction for new product development. Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, Voronta continued to introduce new products along the same lines. The famous Vitomatic series of side-axis cameras (fig. 2) and the Bessamatic series of SLR cameras (fig. 3) were introduced to the market during this period.

As 135-film cameras began to gain a larger and larger share of the market after the 1950s, camera manufacturers shifted their development focus to this relatively small area, and the pattern of maintaining the original development direction of Chase Ikon and Vorono posed a major problem in terms of duplicated development of 135-film camera products. 1960, Vorono's 135-film camera, which had been under development for several years, was introduced to the market in a new way. In 1960, the Bessaflex (Fig. 4), a new 135 SLR with CdS metering that Voronta had been working on for several years, was scrapped just as it was about to be put into production to prevent it from competing with the Contaflex and Contarex SLRs that carried the ZEISSIKON trademark, and for the first time, a conflict between the two brands was brought to the fore. The abolition of Bessaflex came as a major shock to the design team, as it meant that the brand lost its autonomy to develop new products on its own.

As Chase & Icon's financial situation deteriorated into the 1960s, Chase & Icon's management finally decided in 1965 to reduce overhead costs by merging the two long-standing separate management teams into one, and the two separate product design departments were merged, ending the conflict between the two brands. In an attempt at new marketing, the logo we mentioned earlier appeared with the names of the two brands. The designer of the logo must have felt that the two company names were so important that the only way to convey the true strength behind the nameplate was to show them in their entirety.

In 1967, the Icarex 35 S camera (fig. 5) with the ZEISSIKONVOIGTLANDER logo was launched.

Despite the addition of the Vorlunda name to the nameplate, the Icarex 35 S model was really more of a ZEISSIKON grungy DSLR, and there was little to distinguish it from the original Icarex, which carried the exclusive ZEISSIKON logo.

The Icarex was a fairly large series, with models such as the Icarex, Icarex 35, Icarex 35S, Icarex 35CS, etc. The interchangeable lenses have two different interfaces, BM and TM, and the bodies are divided into interchangeable viewfinders and fixed viewfinders, and the viewfinders are divided into top-down viewfinders and viewfinders with CdS metering prisms, etc. (Figs. 6-9). Icarex has a complete range of lenses covering all focal lengths, and some of the original Frenda-branded lens names were added to the lenses later on. original Frenda-branded lens names.

The inclusion of the Vorlunda name probably did little more than provide a marketing benefit to the Vorlunda developers, as the Icarex was a much more Zeiss-Ikonized line of cameras, in form and substance.

In 1966, the Icarex was the first camera in the world to have the Vorlunda name on it.

Beginning in 1966, Zeiss Icoms were sold to the public at a uniform pace, with brochures bearing the Zeiss Icoms Forunda logo featuring both individual Zeiss Icoms and Zeiss Icoms Forunda-branded models (Figure 10). Although the oval-shaped body of the Frenda camera has gradually been replaced by the octagonal rectangular body of the Zeiss Ikon, at least the Frenda name still has an irreplaceable role in marketing. The Frenda brand was gradually integrated into the whole of Zeiss Ikon.

From 1968 to 1970, another line of side-by-side cameras was marketed under the same name of Zeiss Ikon and Frenda***, the new Vitessa line (Figures 11-12). This series included both 126 and 135 film sizes. Although the cameras in this series were defined as low to mid-range, the quality of the cameras was no less impressive, with most of the eight models in the series featuring CdS metering, shutter speeds as fast as 1/1000th of a second in the Vitessa 1000 SR (Fig. 13), and a few featuring linked rangefinders, making the small, sophisticated bodies and advanced features particularly appealing. Unfortunately, by the time this series was introduced to the market, the life of the Zeiss Ikon was already counting down.

When Chase Ikon declared bankruptcy in 1971 due to continued losses, ended all camera production, and shut down all assembly lines in 1972, neither Vorlunda nor its parent company imagined that their combined journey would be so short-lived, coming to an end in just over a decade. Although Lullet took over the Frenda camera brand and its production line and continued the design of new cameras, and also quickly resumed production, but at this time the Frenda from the logo, shape and camera design concepts have been farther and farther away from the tradition of Frenda, and even this situation did not last long, with the decline of the Lullet, the brand Frenda changed hands several times, and finally fell into the hands of the Japanese company, in addition to the development of self-created some models, it also started another journey working for Leica, which is already another story. The Frenda brand reappeared on the market after many years, and the only remaining relationship between the new Frenda and the one that had created a brilliant performance was its name.

Zeiss Ikon was the second of the four major German camera manufacturers to fall. Its bankruptcy and the return of Frenda there are different, because Frenda was acquired by Zeiss Ikon basically did not affect the continuation of this famous brand. The end of Zeiss Ikon, on the other hand, led to a heavy blow to both brands, seriously affecting the development of the German camera manufacturing industry. In fact, the final destiny of both Lulai and Leitz companies was similar, and the overall collapse of the German camera manufacturing industry stemmed from the strong competition from the Japanese. We will have more in-depth analysis of the victory of Japanese camera manufacturers in the future, but from the defeat of Zeiss Ikon we can summarize at least the following three painful lessons.

First, from the camera design and development concept, should adhere to the most advanced technology as soon as possible into the new product. 20 century is the camera manufacturing technology rapid progress of 100 years, in the first 50 years, most of the new technology and invention from the German enterprises, Zeiss Ikon and Forlunda has been the camera technology innovation pioneer. Japanese camera companies, which started out as imitators, only began to enter the international market in the 1950s, but from the 1960s onwards, continued to be the first to apply new technologies to their products. More and more, the title of world number one was held by Japanese brands. Chase Ikon and Forunda's new product development process is too long, in they are still committed to the development of more complex mechanical devices, the Japanese companies have been more advanced and reliable electronic device design in the center of their new product development, research and development results were quickly applied to new products, novel and practical new technology immediately attracted more consumers.

Secondly, in terms of the production cost of the camera, the principle of "cost first" is a higher guideline to open the market. Although German cameras are known for their high-precision mechanical functions, the addition of each new function means a higher cost of components. For example, the Contarex series of high-grade professional cameras, which Zeiss Ikon concentrated on developing, pushed the complex mechanical structure of German cameras to the extreme (Fig. 14). Take the famous Contarex Bullseye (Fig. 15) as an example, this camera, developed over a period of nine years, has more than 1,100 high-precision parts, all of which are produced by Zeiss Ikon itself, which is very costly in terms of design and manufacturing, and such a complex structure requires very specialized technicians for assembly and testing. The camera was designed and manufactured in-house by Zeiss Ikon, and such a complex structure required very specialized technicians to assemble and test the camera. Japan's major camera manufacturers emphasize cost first, take all kinds of ways to reduce costs, complexity into simplicity. Facts have proved that the excellence of the German camera and high-volume assembly line production of Japanese cameras in the competition between the very disadvantageous position.

Third, in terms of marketing, should be adjusted in a timely manner according to market characteristics. In this regard, the German companies are clearly behind the Japanese companies. Like Zeiss Ikon from the establishment of too long a product line, after the annexation of Frenda and exacerbated the situation, such a situation has continued until the day of the collapse of the enterprise. The coexistence of multiple camera models, many of which did not differ significantly in terms of performance, and the failure to make decisive choices for a variety of reasons did not lead to complementarity, but rather to internal friction, and the large product catalog led to a fragmentation of the direction and focus of sales. The same period of Japan's camera several major brands Canon, Nikon, Minolta, Pentax, Olympus and other companies are on the one hand, each focusing on strengthening their respective technological advantages, on the other hand, but also cooperate with each other, coordinated and controlled by the Japanese private sector, using their advantages in cost, increase publicity to clear and firm short-term goal of strong development of overseas markets. Japanese companies to jackal pack attack, one by one to defeat the German enterprises, soon dominated the international camera market, and never give the German camera the opportunity to re-emerge.

With the maturity of digital technology, I have a few film cameras with ZEISSIKONVOIGTLANDER nameplate no longer have a place, can only be placed as a decorative object, and occasionally take it out to fiddle with, try to try to focus on the accuracy of the yellow spot, listen to the crisp and pleasant sound of the shutter, look at how many of these people after the painstaking efforts to build a boutique, the brain emerged is the The sad scene of the sinking of the German camera manufacturing ship.

Photo captions:

Figure 1 Trademark with the words "Zeiss Ikon Frenda".

Figure 2 The Vitomatic IIIc camera.

Figure 3 The Voronta Bessamatic Delux.

Figure 4 A prototype of the Vorlunda Bessaflex camera, which was discontinued without going into production.

Figure 5 Zeiss Ikon Forlunda Icarex 35 S model.

Figure 6 The Icarex 35S TM model has a ribbed lens interface.

Figure 7 Icarex 35S BM model with bayonet lens interface.

Fig. 8 Icarex 35 SE model with interchangeable roof viewfinder, lens 135/4.

Fig. 9 Icarex 35 SE model with Tensel 2.8/50 standard lens, close-up viewfinder developed for this camera, slogan in German on the roof box: Part of the Golden Plan. 1960s Zeiss Ikon slogan.

Fig. 10 Post-unification brochure with the Zeiss Ikon Frenda mark.

Figure 11 Vitessa 500/1000 series cameras.

Figure 12 Beautiful woodgrain version of the Vitessa 500 AE model.

Figure 13 The Vitessa 1000 reaches its fastest speed of 1/1000th of a second.

Figure 14 The Contarex SE, a series of cameras that pushed the boundaries of complex German camera mechanics.

Figure 15 The Contarex Bullseye with more than 1,100 high-precision parts.

Figure 15 Contarex Bullseye with more than 1,100 high-precision parts.