On October 3, 1951, Mao Zedong called Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai on the issue of changing the venue of the talks: Regarding the issue of changing the venue of the conference, after repeated consideration, we think that for the time being we should adopt your original idea of rejecting the enemy's unreasonable demand and prepare to drag on with the enemy for a period of time. Because the enemy's current policy is to delay, it is useless for me to hurry, and when the enemy really wants to solve the problem, then we can pull together. Therefore, the proposed reply can be simple, for the handling of the unfinished business, that is, not canceled, also not mentioned for the time being, to see how the other side reflects (should). The reply is attached and can be sent on the morning of October 4th. Beijing intends to broadcast it on the evening of the 4th and publish it in the newspaper on the 5th, asking Pyongyang to publish it at the same time.
On Oct. 3, Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai replied to Li Qiwei, pointing out that there was no reason for changing the address of the talks and again suggesting that the talks be resumed immediately in Kaesong.
On Oct. 4, Li Qiwei replied to Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai, suggesting that since you had rejected our proposal to meet at Songhyun-ri, we propose that our delegation meet at a place of your choice, acceptable to us, roughly halfway between the two fronts.
On the 4th, Mao Tse-tung called Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai that it would be inadvisable for the Volunteer side to refuse once again to change the venue, but that it should take the initiative to propose the resumption of the meeting of the delegations of the two sides at Panmunjom, and that a body should be set up at the meeting with the participation of representatives of the two sides to lay down a strict agreement on the protection of the area of the meeting at Panmunjom by patrols under the responsibility of the two sides and to ensure that the agreement would be carried out.
On the 6th, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai replied to Li Qiwei, proposing to resume the meeting of the delegations of both sides at Panmunjom.
On the 7th, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai replied to Li Qiwei's letter of the 4th, pointing out that the other side's destruction of the Kaesong Neutral Zone agreement could never be evaded by moving the address of the meeting.
At the same time, they pointed out that the present problem should be the immediate resumption of the armistice talks and the strict stipulation of the agreement on the neutralization of the conference area and the safety and security of the conference venue at the meeting of the delegations of the two sides, so that this kind of violation of the agreement will not be repeated in the past, and especially so that the two sides will be held accountable for the agreement, and that the agreement will not be allowed to be used to bind only one side as it was in the past, while the other side can arbitrarily destroy and deny it under the pretext of not having any responsibility for the area. It is recommended that the Armistice Conference area should be neutralized. To this end, it is recommended that the neutral zone of the Armistice Conference area should be expanded into a long zone including both Kaesong and Munsan, and that the address of the meeting place should be moved to Panmunjom, and both sides should be responsible for the protection of this meeting place.
On the 8th, Li Qiwei replied to Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai, agreeing that the venue should be Panmunjom and suggesting that the liaison officers of the two sides meet on the 10th to discuss the resumption of negotiations.
On October 9, Mao Zedong called Li K'nong and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai to put forward two proposals on the expansion of the scope of the Neutral Zone: 1. Kaesong to Panmunjom to Bunsan to be delineated as a long Neutral Zone, i.e., 3 miles on each side along this avenue to be the Neutral Zone;
2. Panmunjom to be the center, delineate the surrounding 5 miles to be the Neutral Zone, while the two corridors from Kaesong to Bunsan to Panmunjom 3 miles on each side as a neutral zone. It is estimated that the other side may accept the latter option more easily.
On the 10th, liaison officers from both sides of the Korean Armistice Talks met in Panmunjom to discuss the conditions under which the representatives of the two sides would resume the talks. The U.N. military liaison officer proposed that only a small neutral zone around the new meeting address and the highway from Kaesong and Munsan to Panmunjom could be guaranteed against attack.
In effect, the air threat to the premises of the Chinese and North Korean delegations in Kaesong was to remain. In view of the lessons learned from past incidents, the Chinese and DPRK sides insisted that the scope of the neutral zone between Kaesong and Munsan should be expanded to ensure that the armistice talks can be carried out without interference.
Zhou Enlai, on the report "The Program of Drawing 300,000 Troops from the Korean Battlefield to the Northeast for Training," said: "This program can be agreed upon, and I would like to ask the chairman to approve it.
Mao Zedong on the 11th approved: agree, return Zhou to do.
On the 12th, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram to Li Kénong for Mao Zedong, pointing out that at the liaison officers' meeting, it could be said in camera that the question of enlarging the Neutral Zone should be formally discussed at the delegates' meeting, but in order to prepare for the discussion at the delegates' meeting, it would not be opposed to exchanging views informally on this question at the liaison officers' meeting.
Mao Tse-tung added a paragraph to this telegram: such a U-turn would be much better than one by Jin and Peng, and it would be better to make the U-turn earlier.
On the 13th, Mao Tse-tung called Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai: Your handling of the strafing incident by the enemy planes is very proper. Regardless of whether the enemy publicly admits his mistake tomorrow and apologizes or denies it, you should, in addition to strictly refuting his denials, not be too busy to express your final attitude and insist on the draft agreement you proposed at the liaison officers' meeting tomorrow.
On the 14th, Mao Zedong called the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army in the name of the Central Committee of the People's Republic of China, informing it that the telegram of September 20, 1951 had been received. And that the general policy of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army on the Korean question was correct. The message said: Deng Hua is now in Beijing, the Central Committee has told him about the recent decisions on the strategic policy of the Volunteer Army, the saving of troops, the saving of materials, the saving of funds and the construction of fortifications along the coast close to the enemy's possible landing place, and he will convey them to you. I hope that you will take into account the actual situation and prescribe specific methods of implementation in order to strive for the final victory in the Korean War.
The Central Committee expresses its gratification and sympathy to all the comrades of the Volunteer Army for their heroic struggle for a whole year under the leadership of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army and Peng Dehuai, and for the great victory they have achieved.
The task at hand is to strive with all efforts for final victory. At present, the domestic situation is very good, the whole party and the whole country warmly support. The international situation is also in our favor, the United Nations forces have many difficulties. We also have difficulties, some of which are great, but may be overcome. As long as the comrades continue to work hard and remain united with the North Korean comrades, the final victory can be achieved.
On the 15th, Mao Tse-tung called Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai: It was agreed that at the liaison officers' meeting on the 16th, the volunteer side would take the initiative to put forward a proposal to draw a 5-mile radius of Bunsan as a neutral zone and hand it over to the other side as a style of provisional agreement with a view to opening up the stalemate. However, in preparation for the turn, it should be stated in camera that Munsan and Kaesong should be on an equal footing.
On the 16th, Mao Tse-tung telephoned Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai that the other side was very much afraid that the designation of Munsan as a neutral zone of the same size as Kaesong would leave the doorway to Seoul open and the agreement on a neutral zone for Kaesong would tie up the operations of its air force. Therefore, the other side's dispute over the conditions for the resumption of the conference centered on the reduction of the boundaries of the Kaesong and Munsan sites, the absence of a neutral zone, and the stipulation that no armed action would be carried out. Obviously, this is an attempt to enable the continuation of their sabotage operations if necessary in order to carry out their threats. Therefore, I would like to ask you to consider that when you take the initiative to set up a provisional agreement on the establishment of a neutral zone with a 5-mile radius of Munsan, you should state that the scope of the sites of the delegations of the two sides can be submitted to a meeting of the delegations for consideration, but that the scope of the passageway between the sites of the two sides and Panmunjom must not be confined to the highway only, but that a certain area must be set aside on both sides and that any hostile guerrilla activities should be halted, or else there is no guarantee of the safety of the people of both sides in their travels.
On the 17th, Mao Tse-tung called Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai that it would be very difficult for the United Nations Army to make a U-turn in the present dispute without a U-turn on the part of the Volunteer Army, and that these U-turns would be of a secondary nature in comparison with the relocation of the site of the conference to Panmunjom.
On the 18th, Mao Zedong called Li K'nong and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai that the present policy of the volunteer side in the liaison officers' meeting should be to bring about the resumption of the meeting quickly, with the attitude of neither hurrying nor dragging it out but taking the initiative to put forward, in due course, methods acceptable to both sides in order to solve some of the side issues.
On the 21st, the Third Division of the Volunteer Air Force, led by Acting Division Commander Yuan Bin and Political Commissar Gao Houliang, departed for the Andong front to exchange defense with the Fourth Division of the Volunteer Air Force and participate in the air war with the U.S. Army. The division participated in the war in Korea for 80 days, **** shot down 55 U.S. planes and wounded 8.
22nd, Mao Zedong called Li Knong, and told Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai: in order not to distort the other side of the propaganda, tomorrow should be published in the South RiFuJiaoei letter, in the letter to explain: in order not to make the past sabotage of the agreement to recur, our delegation is authorized to ratify the two sides of liaison officers have already obtained the five **** with the understanding of both sides of the two sides of the delegation resumption of meetings will immediately come into effect on the date of the two sides of the understanding.
The next day, Namil wrote to Joye, proposing to resume the talks between the two delegations on the 25th.
On October 22, at 10:00 p.m., the liaison officers of the two sides finally reached an agreement on the resumption of the meeting between the two delegations, the main provisions of which are:
1. the exact place of resumption of the meeting of the two delegations in the vicinity of Panmunjom;
2. the area of the venue is the center of the venue and the radius of 1,000 yards of the circular zone;
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3. All armed personnel of the two sides, including all armed personnel of regular and irregular forces on land, at sea and in the air, shall refrain from any hostile action with respect to the meeting place area as specified above;
4. Armed personnel of the two sides shall not be allowed to enter the meeting place area, except for the military police as specified. The maintenance of security and order in the conference area shall be assisted in this task by military police units composed of two officers and 18 soldiers from each side. During the absence of the members of the delegations, one officer and five soldiers from each side of the military police shall be stationed in the conference area. The weapons carried by the military police shall be limited to small arms, i.e., pistols, rifles, and carbines;
5. The delegations of the two sides and their constituents shall have free access to the Panmunjom venue area and shall be free to move about in the area. The composition of the delegations of the two sides shall be determined by their respective chief representatives.
6. With regard to the material and equipment required for the negotiating sessions and the meeting area, as well as the arrangements for communication and administration, the liaison officers of the two sides shall agree that the Chinese and the DPRK delegations shall be responsible for supplying the appropriate equipment for the delegations and the meeting place, and shall be responsible for the setting up of the conference room. The Chinese and Korean delegations shall be responsible for the supply of appropriate *** equipment for the use of the delegations and the meeting place and for the decoration of the conference rooms.
7. All armed forces of the two sides, including all regular and irregular forces and armed personnel of the army, navy and air force, shall not engage in any hostile action in the circular area with a radius of 3 miles around the Kaesong Traffic Center and the United Nations delegation in the circular area with a radius of 3 miles around the center of the circle as shown in the annexed map, as well as in the area of 200 meters on each side of the passages of Kaesong, Panmunjom and Bunsan. hostile action.
8. The date and time of the resumption of the meetings of the delegations of the two sides shall be decided through consultations between the liaison officers of the two sides.
At the same time, the Liaison Officers of the two sides have also reached the ***Same Understanding***5, that is: 1. The term armed forces in the agreement includes only armed forces and armed personnel under the control of the two sides or openly and secretly instigated by them. 2. When the facts discovered in the investigations of the Parties prove beyond reasonable doubt that the persons responsible in any one case were under the control of, or at the overt or covert instigation of, one of the Parties, that Party shall not be permitted to shirk its responsibility.
2. Investigations into reported breaches of the Agreement will be conducted in accordance with the practice of past Liaison Officers.
3. The agreement reached between the liaison officers of the two sides on the resumption of the meetings of the two delegations will serve as a draft of the relevant parts of the agreement on the overall arrangements to be determined by the two delegations for the entire period of the armistice negotiations.
4. The agreement on security arrangements for the entire period of the armistice negotiations, as resolved by the two delegations, shall replace all previous security agreements and the agreements on the Kaesong venue area and the neutral zone.
5. Military aircraft of both sides shall not fly over the Panmunjom venue area except under uncontrollable climatic and technical conditions. Military aircraft of the United Nations forces shall not fly over the Kaesong district and the access area from Kaesong district to the Panmunjom venue area. Military aircraft of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army shall not fly over the area of the passageway from the Munsan district to the Panmunjom site area.
On Oct. 23, Mao Zedong pointed out in his opening speech at the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that the whole Chinese people were united in an unprecedentedly wide range of anti-U.S. aid campaigns and waged a resolute struggle against the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism.
The Chinese People's Volunteer Army, representing the great will of the Chinese people, together with the Korean People's Army, broke the arrogant plan of the U.S. imperialists to try to invade the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*** and the country and, in turn, to invade the Chinese mainland. Thus, the peace-loving people of Korea, China, Asia and the whole world were inspired and their confidence in defending peace and opposing aggression was increased.
On Oct. 23, Zhou Enlai made a political report at the third session of the first national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, pointing out that the Chinese people had comprehensively strengthened and consolidated themselves in the just war against the U.S.A. and against North Korea. The U.S. government held hostage the majority of the United Nations and adopted on February 1 this year a resolution that is absurd and shameless to the extreme in slandering China as an aggressor.
Following this resolution, the majority of the United Nations adopted a resolution on the embargo against China, which was held hostage by the United States. The foolish and ignorant US imperialists were full of confidence that the blockade and embargo would surely deal a heavy blow to China, but they were totally wrong.
The blockade and embargo of the imperialists have been used to purge China's economy of its semi-colonial dependence, to shorten the process of China's gaining full economic independence and freedom, and to speed up the process of combating the economic privileges of the imperialists in China.
The Chinese people, in the campaign against the United States and for Korea, have at the same time successfully and thoroughly purged China of the cultural aggression of the United States imperialists over the years, and have gradually purged it of the ideas of pro-Americanism, reverence for the United States, and fear of the United States. All this is very favorable to the Chinese state and people.
On the 24th, the chief representatives of the two sides exchanged letters ratifying the events of the above agreements and understandings and proposed to hold formal talks the next day.
On the same day, Mao Tse-tung telephoned Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai: On the question of armistice, we may take the initiative at the first meeting after the resumption of the conference to propose a new demarcation line to be proposed by each of the two sides which can be approached and prepared for consideration by the other side.
If the other side agrees, we can then put forward a proposal for adjustment in accordance with the existing line.
Peng Zhen, vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Committee for the Defense of World Peace Against U.S. Aggression, made a report on the "Campaign for Resistance to U.S. Aid for Korea and Defense of the Nation" at the third session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The report said that the patriotic movement of the Chinese people against the United States and for the defense of the country in the rear in the past year, in conjunction with the combat of the volunteer army at the front, has also made great achievements.
The masses of the country, including the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, as well as people of all nationalities and religions, have joined the patriotic movement against the U.S. and for the DPRK, which has already reached 70 to 80 percent of the country's population.
There have been many sad stories of mothers sending off their sons, wives sending off their husbands, and brothers fighting for enlistment in the army.
Thousands of farmers and transportation workers volunteered to go to the DPRK to perform various field services. Medical workers volunteered to organize more than 50 medical teams to the Korean front to serve the volunteer army and the Korean People's Army, and millions of pieces of letters of condolence, souvenirs and bags of condolence have been sent to the front.
As of Oct. 18, the monetary equivalent of 2,618 combat aircraft, or 392.7 million yuan, had been donated in just four and a half months.
There are already 580,000 young students and young workers in the country who have voluntarily enrolled in various military cadre schools, and now the volunteers are all ready, and as long as the order is given, they will be able to get whatever they want in terms of men, money and other things, which represents the will and mood of the people of all strata of the Chinese people, and is a guarantee that the volunteers will be able to achieve the final victory.
The Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference made the Resolution on the Work of Anti-U.S. Assistance to North Korea: to continue to mobilize China's manpower, material and financial resources to support the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army at the Korean front; to carry out on a large scale the Patriotic Campaign for Increasing Production and Saving, to strengthen the strength of the anti-U.S. assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the country's national construction; to complete and continue to expand the campaign of donating weapons; to popularize and deepen the patriotic pact movement.
On Oct. 25, the talks, which had been suspended for 63 days, resumed and the venue was chosen at Panmunjom. Du Ping, deputy director of the Political Department of the Volunteer Army, was ordered to join the armistice delegation of the Chinese and North Korean sides and participate in the preparation of the issue of prisoners of war, the fourth agenda item of the armistice talks.
The new venue for the resumption of talks was moved from Kaesong to Panmunjom because Kaesong was under the control of China and North Korea, and the U.S. side requested that the new venue be moved to an area not under the sole control of either side, while Panmunjom happened to be located in the middle of the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, and thus was accepted by both sides.
At that time, the negotiation room was built on the military demarcation line, and the center line of the negotiation table was the military demarcation line, and the negotiators of the two sides entered and left the room through their respective doors and sat on chairs of their respective sides without crossing the demarcation line, which was a special way of negotiation with no precedent in the history of the world.
The Korean Armistice Talks resumed in Panmunjom and continued with the second agenda discussion. The Chinese and North Korean sides announced that Bian Zhangwu would replace Deng Hua as the chief representative of the Volunteer Army and Jung Doo-hwan would replace Jang Pyong-san as the negotiator. The other side, Lee Hyung-geun, replaced Baek Sun-yeol and Turner replaced Krech.
On the 29th, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army held a meeting of senior cadres at Hinokura, southeast of Sungcheon, attended by the leaders of the corps, the Volunteer Army Logistics Command, the armies and related departments. The meeting ended on the 31st.
The meeting mainly conveyed and carried out the policy of the Central Committee of the C*** on streamlining and economizing, and studied and deployed the work of integrating the Volunteer Army. There are four main categories of personnel to be downsized: first, units whose formations belong to the Volunteer Army but are supplied from within the country, such as instructional units at all levels, unarmed artillery to be mounted, and recruit training regiments;
second, surplus personnel and old, sick, and disabled personnel to be disposed of;
third, formations to be transferred back to the country, such as the Twenty-Third Regiment, the Forty-Seventh Division of the Sixteenth Army, and the Replacement Division of the Twenty-Third Regiment that repairs airfields;
Fourth, war service personnel, such as civilian laborers, task forces, engineering teams, etc.. All organs and units of the Volunteer Army began to integrate around November 15th.
By the end of December it was basically completed. Through the integration, the requirements of streamlining the organs, enriching the companies and improving the combat effectiveness of the troops were met.
The Political Department of the Volunteer Air Force formulated a unified standard for pilots' wartime merits. The standard stipulates that: anyone who shoots down an enemy plane is a second-class merit, anyone who shoots down two enemy planes is a first-class merit, and anyone who shoots down more than three enemy planes is a special merit; anyone who wounds an enemy plane is a third-class merit, anyone who wounds two enemy planes is a second-class merit, and anyone who wounds three enemy planes is a first-class merit.
Mao Zedong called Li K'nung and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai: After the line of contact between the two sides is determined, we should take the initiative to put forward the program of on-the-spot armistice with a slight adjustment. I hope that according to the front line of position of the two sides as reported by the Zhi Si, you will draw up your adjustment program and telegraph it tonight, so that we can consider it first and make preparations in advance.
The leadership of the Volunteer Army has issued instructions that in November and December, except for particularly favorable circumstances, it will not be prepared to carry out a major counter-offensive campaign on all fronts.
After December, the entire Volunteer Army shifted to the consolidation of positions, and the sixth battle was canceled on its own. The Volunteer Command issued instructions on strengthening the defense deployment in the Kaesong area. After that, the 65th Volunteer Army strengthened its troops west of Kaesong and west of the Imjin River, and the 63rd Volunteer Army advanced to the area of Janghwa-dong and Hwazang-dong northeast of Kaesong in preparation for coordinating with the 65th Volunteer Army in resisting the enemy's attack on Kaesong.
On October 30, the volunteer army carried out local counterattack operations, until the end of November, has conducted 34 counterattacks on the enemy battalion below the strength of the defense of the 26 objectives, the total annihilation of the United Nations Army two battalions, 13 companies, 5 platoons, the majority of the United Nations Army annihilated 6 companies, *** killed, wounded and captured more than 10,000 United Nations Army, captured 21 United Nations Army positions, and strongly cooperated with the armistice negotiation struggle.
The UN Army's position was captured in 21 places.
On October 31, Mao Zedong called Li K'nung, and told Kim Il-sung, Peng Dehuai: agreed with the 30th call that we should take the initiative on the 31st to put forward the principle of local armistice slightly adjusted views. If the other side insists on the program proposed on October 25, we should at that time or in the afternoon meeting to be a stern rebuttal, expose the other side opposed to the armistice on the spot, the division of military demarcation line, but still trying to penetrate into the Volunteer side of the rear of the battle line of the conspiracy, forcing the other side in the Volunteer program to reach an agreement.