From the above text, it can be seen that in the initial stage, Rommel personally collected information on the terrain of the theater and the characteristics of the desert area. Subsequently, military geographic units became involved in collecting and producing extremely useful materials and maps for the German army. These military geographic units were attached to the German Afrika Korps, and upon arrival in Africa, they immediately began to survey the theater of operations, systematically collecting data and conducting reconnaissance of the terrain. In addition, captured British maps were of great help. Finally, the Germans obtained their own military maps, including:
What areas were accessible to all types of vehicles;
What areas were moderately accessible or only marginally accessible;
Location of steep slopes;
Location of inaccessible areas, such as salt lakes, salt marshes, etc.
Location of dunes;
Vegetation growth; and
What was the condition of the vegetation.
Location of rugged terrain;
Location of steep impassable slopes;
Location of steep slopes that can be traversed by vehicles;
Location of roads that can be traversed by vehicles;
As can be seen from the above, in order to obtain accurate maps for fighting in a desert environment, commanders had to deploy sufficient personnel and adequate technical equipment. After the winter of 1941, the German army used accurate maps. All offensive and defensive deployments depended on them. At the same time, the Military Geography Department of the German Army High Command issued the booklet "Military Geography of Libya, Egypt and North Africa", which included information on tactics in desert areas. The pamphlet was issued to the regimental staff level.
However, the Germans lost considerable time. As described earlier, for almost all of 1941, the Germans were deployed only on the defensive because they had no reliable information, and Rommel's idea was to hold off the British and not lose all of Libya, and that was it.
Combat training and equipment
At the beginning of the Second World War, the German army was not prepared enough to fight outside Europe. Therefore, the German army did not pay special attention to the experience of fighting in desert areas, especially in the First World War, Germany in its former colonies in East Africa, and before the outbreak of the war in 1939, the German army did not make any preparations to fight in the desert areas in the future. All preparations, including establishment and training, were centered around fighting in Europe. This can be seen from a small fact: in 1938, a mobilization order of the Bureau of Map Surveys and Measurements of the German Army Staff: for future operations, it was necessary to print a number of maps. This included Denmark, Norway, but not North Africa. This order from the Director General of the Directorate concluded that there was no need to prepare maps of North Africa at all.
Until the summer of 1940, the only messages that reached the German General Staff from North Africa were those of assistance to the German equipment in Italy and reports of information obtained by German counter-intelligence. When the Germans ordered to go to Africa, the Army High Command did not have time to make complete preparations for the war, and in the shortest possible time they made the following arrangements:
1) A call-up order was issued to the entire army, and the soldiers enrolled in the Afrika Korps were subjected to rigorous physical examinations, from which men qualified for tropical warfare were selected.
2)Issuance of tropical uniforms.
3)Changing the training curriculum to meet the requirements of tropical warfare.
4)Repainting all combat vehicles in desert colors.
5)Formation of a special unit for solving water problems.
6)Soldiers were taught the medical knowledge necessary to fight in the tropics.
7)The soldiers were taught the geography of the desert region and the methods and habits of enemy and friendly forces. Later, in the summer of 1942, a manual for fighting in desert areas was issued.
Another thing that proved that the Germans lacked experience in desert warfare was their dress. The uniforms of the Afrika Korps were completely different from those of Europe. They were made of impermeable linen and were closer in style to those used by the Germans in the African colonies in World War I.
African Army Corps uniforms were a far cry from those used in Europe, and were made of impermeable linen. Both the fabric and the style proved to be unsuitable. The fabric was too stiff to provide good protection against heat and cold. In the early hours of the morning, moisture would form dew on the fabric and make it unwearable. On the contrary, the British uniforms were made of pure wool and fit perfectly. Later, the Germans wore captured British uniforms (of course, medals, ranks, etc. were changed to German). The Germans especially liked the British pants. The color of the German uniform was dark greenish-brown, which was not good for camouflage in the desert. The most difficult to accept is the high boots, in the high temperature, is not conducive to the blood circulation of the legs; and when the combat wounded, it is difficult to take off the boots, affecting the rescue time. Therefore, a lot of soldiers wore military shoes which were captured from Britain. The German army wore dark green-brown caps, not steel helmets, while the British army issued light-colored steel helmets. It was only later that the Germans were able to correct this in practice.
Because of time constraints, the Germans were unable to reorganize their troops in 1941, so the Afrika Korps was formed like European troops. Subsequent operational experience showed that, although it was not necessary to create units specifically for desert operations, the units had to be equipped with more tanks and anti-tank weapons, because in desert areas the role of these two weapons was decisive. This does not mean that all units fighting in the desert must be motorized.
The Germans created special units for desert environments, including:
Water supply companies: These companies were part of the Water Supply Directorate of the Afrika Korps Logistics Department. These companies were equipped with pumping and well-drilling equipment. Some of these companies are also equipped with distillation equipment.
Water convoys: These are also part of the logistics and transportation department, except that these convoys are exclusively used to transport water. But instead of using tanker trucks or trailers, as in Britain, they carry buckets of 20-liter drums. The result is a huge waste of space and inefficiency, as well as a waste of gasoline.
Meteorological Observation Teams: These are made up of professional meteorologists, some of whom are given full military rank. These teams were attached to the military special staff and were tasked with establishing weather observation points.
As the war progressed, the Germans changed some of their weapon configurations: long-range artillery, long-range anti-tank guns, and tank guns. These weapons played an extremely important role in the desert war. Comparison of British and German artillery below 100mm caliber, British 87.6mm howitzers had a longer range, however, the German Afrika Korps soon deployed 100mm and 170mm class artillery. These guns had a longer range than the British. Also in 1941,
German tanks of the III class had a longer range than British tanks. So the Germans won the battle in 1941. However, after May 1942, Britain was equipped with American Grant Lee and Sherman tanks. However, after May 1942, the British were equipped with American Grant Lee and Sherman tanks, whose guns had a longer range. These tanks terrorized the Germans at the Battle of Kadjara, and in the first phase of the battle, they won a major victory.
The German Afrika Korps was equipped with all the same types of automobile armored vehicles as its European counterparts. Although the same gasoline could be used, the car itself had to be partially modified. Volkswagen cars were widely used, and air intakes were built into the car in order to adapt to the desert environment and prevent sand and dust from entering the engine. Standard tires were replaced by extra-wide aircraft tires to fit the uneven gravel terrain. Because these tires had less air pressure, they avoided excessive bumps: and because they were wider than standard tires, they avoided sinking into sand puddles when driving on sandy terrain. By and large, the British army because of the desert experience, both car tires, and power are more adaptable to the desert environment. In particular, the car was low. In the desert, the cars had to carry their own winches and ropes so that they could be rescued if they got stuck in the sand. It's important to carry extra air filters to replace them.
In a desert environment, each man would have more tasks to perform, so each man had to carry a compass. The British compasses were so much better than the Germans', with dials suspended in oil, that the Germans organized special missions to capture them. Experience showed that convoys had to be equipped with an aerial compass. The compass was placed next to the driver so as not to get lost.
At first, the Germans did not develop or equip special protection against mosquitoes or other insects, which were especially important in summer. Later, the Germans made an emergency purchase of insecticides to be distributed to combat units.
The following lessons were learned from the above description:
There must be uniforms suited to combat in desert areas;
vehicles must be fitted with special filters;
specialized tropical medicines and medical equipment must be issued.
As far as training was concerned, the German Afrika Korps had no time for special training during its formation, and was simply given lectures on desert basics by medical officers and officers. Unfortunately, these vague explanations of the desert, climate and disease prevention gave the soldiers the wrong impression. When the army arrived in Africa, it began the following training:
Training on how to march and fight in formation in the desert environment,
Training on how to camp for long periods of time;
Training on how to build fortifications in the sand;
Training on how to drive all types of armored tanks in the sand and at night,
Training on how to form and spread out in the flat areas at night;
Training on how to form and spread out in the flat areas at night;
Training on how to move and spread out at night;
Training on how to move and spread out at night in the flat areas at night, marching, unfolding;
Training individuals how to use the compass, the stars into the armored vehicles;
Training how to mine and mine clearance in desert environments;
Mobility combat exercises in desert environments;
Initially arriving in Africa, German soldiers were difficult to adapt to Africa's tropical climate all of a sudden, and so some units were later in Italy or the Balkan Peninsula to carry out The climate in these two places was very similar to that of northern Africa along the Mediterranean coast. Subsequent experience has shown, however, that acclimatization is not very effective because it is only a climatic similarity, whereas the combination of food scarcity, the harshness of the war environment and the climate cannot be simulated. Comparisons have shown that troops with extended combat experience in temperate zones (e.g., the Balkans) were better able to fight in Africa in the first year than those who had previously fought in Europe. After one year, the average combat capability declined. However, the decline was more severe for units with temperate experience, which gradually increased in effectiveness after 1-2 years, but never returned to the level of the first year. Therefore, the following lessons have been learned from the German Afrika Korps:
There is no need to conduct a long period of acclimatization training in the previous positioning;
Training of vehicles on how to use the compass to position themselves while traveling;
Training of all types of tanks to be repaired in the desert environment, which wastes the maximum effectiveness of the unit's first year of operation;
Short period acclimatization training can be carried out in the tropics, and the unit's performance in the first year of operation can be reduced to the level of the first year of operation. Short acclimatization training in the tropics, desert survival training; do not carry out high-intensity exercises;
The troops after nearly a year or so of combat deployment in the desert area, it is best to change to other areas. The downside of this, however, is that those who have gained experience will only be in the area for a short period of time, and the new troops will have to start all over again.
Logistics
Logistics was an important part of the overall battle plan. German logistical support had to be accomplished at top speed to support North Africa. Primarily, logistics were sent by rail to Italian ports and then shipped by ship to North Africa. The German Africa Transportation Directorate, based in Rome, was in charge of transportation scheduling. Initially, all supplies and personnel were transported by sea, but when the loss of ships continued, personnel were transported by air. Materiel unloaded in Africa was transported to the front line by the Afrika Korps logistics administration.
It was extremely difficult to maintain such a long supply line (especially the Mediterranean sea line), and when all the efforts were in vain, the logistics naturally collapsed. The logistical situation of the German Afrika Korps at various times was as follows:
In February and May 1941, all troop movements and deliveries of supplies were unimpeded. The convoys usually arrived in Tripoli undamaged. At the request of the German command, Italian submarines also joined in the delivery of fuel oil and other cargoes, which were unloaded at Derna (editor's note: a port in northeastern Libya). Supplies were transported by small transports between ports along the North African coast.
In June-December 1941 British surface ships and submarines began to strike at German troop and logistical shipments. As losses of transports mounted, Germany began to use airplanes to transport combat troops and supplies. Some heavy equipment, such as tanks, continued to be transported by sea. By December, Italian battleships joined the convoys.
The transportation during the period January-June 1942 was mainly by air. The entire airlift was very smooth, with few losses. With sufficient logistical support, the German-Italian coalition conducted an offensive operation in May-June, advancing the front to the Egyptian border. In addition, 6-8 weeks of supplies were stockpiled in case of an emergency.
When Rommel's Afrika Korps took the northeastern Libyan port city of Tobruk in July 1942-May 1943 and moved into Egyptian territory, logistical supplies were piled up in Tripoli and Benghazi. The supplies were so far from the front line that they were of little use. The Luftwaffe became very busy, protecting the routes and fighting offensively. At Malta, the British were recovering and deploying new radar-equipped long-range bombers. German shipping was virtually cut off, and Italian battleships were kept in port for lack of fuel. The routes to Tripoli and Benghazi were cut off. The air transport line from Crete, Greece, to Libya became vital. But the amount of supplies could not keep up with the losses at the front.
After the Germans occupied Tunisia, the route across the Mediterranean became much shorter. Nevertheless, because most of the transports were small, they could not keep up with the pace of resupply. With the gradual strengthening of British and American air strikes, the German army's transportation capacity was decreasing. When the Germans were surrounded in Tunisia, they lost control of the air. Few ships could reach Africa safely any more. Whether it was the Mediterranean sea or the sky, it was now the domain of the British and the Americans, and the German army in North Africa, cut off from Europe, was doomed to failure.