The following is a related statement by a scholar in the Department of Sociology of Tsinghua University:
Judging from the current situation, the bottom of our society is mainly composed of the following parts. First, the poor and middle peasants. In the early 1980s, under the dual effects of rural economic system reform and raising the prices of agricultural and sideline products, farmers' income and living standards once increased rapidly [2], and even Liancheng people were psychologically unbalanced at that time. Then, while the enterprises in the city are still severely bound by the old system, the "free flowing resources" released by the rural reform have accumulated in the countryside because they cannot flow into the cities with closed systems, resulting in the temporary prosperity of township enterprises. This temporary prosperity and vitality make people mistakenly think that there is a real opportunity for rural development in China, and some scholars have summarized it as a Chinese-style modernization model of "never leaving home". However, the good times did not last long. After the energy of rural reform was basically released in the mid-1980s, the growth rate of farmers' income began to slow down obviously [3]. In the mid-1990s, township enterprises came to the end of their tether. Coupled with the continuous decline in the prices of agricultural and sideline products such as grain, the "weak" characteristics of farmers began to gradually emerge. According to experts' estimation, in the last few years of the 1990s, the price of grain dropped by more than 30%. This means that for the vast majority of farmers, the actual income has declined in recent years. On the one hand, the real income of farmers has decreased, on the other hand, the income of urban residents has increased, resulting in a rapid expansion of the gap between urban and rural areas. 1978, the ratio of urban and rural per capita income in China was 2: 4: 1, and it fell to 1 and 7: 1 in 1983. It shows an obvious shrinking trend. However, when 1997, it quickly expanded to 2,5:1,and then to 2,79:1in 2000 (Zhu, 2002). The income gap between urban and rural residents has reached a new historical level. Judging from the financial assets owned, the balance of farmers' savings at the end of1000 billion yuan in 1999 was about1000 billion yuan, which was less than one fifth of the national savings balance, and farmers accounted for nearly 65% of the national population. The seriousness of farmers' problems does not lie in the poverty situation of farmers shown by the above figures. More importantly, as long as the structural conditions that farmers are bound to the "countryside" remain unchanged, there is almost no hope for solving farmers' problems. It is a basic fact that the income of farmers in China has little direct relationship with the harvest of agricultural production, especially grain production. In recent years, grain production has basically been bumper or flat. Even in the harvest year, the income of farmers has not increased or even decreased. However, with China's accession to the WTO, the prices of most domestic agricultural and sideline products are much higher than those in the international market, and it is obviously impossible to increase farmers' income by substantially raising the prices of agricultural and sideline products. The question is clear. In an era of industrialization and modernization, the resources and wealth provided by "native land" will be very limited, and its proportion in the whole economy will become smaller and smaller. The only difference is that in western countries, this process is accompanied by a large influx of rural labor and population into cities, and the population on the "native land" is getting less and less; In China, when this process happens, the barriers between urban and rural areas will still bind the vast rural population to the "native land", and the huge rural population (nearly 654.38 billion+0 billion) will share the shrinking resources and wealth. In this case, it is inevitable that farmers who make a living by farming will become the bottom of society. In rural areas, the most noteworthy is the poor people who still have not solved the problem of food and clothing. According to the white paper "Poverty Alleviation and Development in Rural Areas of China" published by the State Council Information Office, by the end of 2000, there were still 30 million poor people in rural areas of China who did not have enough to eat and wear, and the proportion of poor people in the total rural population was about 3%. As far as this part of the population is concerned, the problem of basic survival needs has not been completely solved. Take health care as an example. According to a recent survey, 70% of farmers think that the current medical expenses are increasing too fast, and 20% of farmers have made it clear that they can't afford to see the disease. The number of patients who have no money to see a doctor, buy medicine or stay in hospital has increased. The proportion of farmers who are ill and have no money to see a doctor has increased from 4% in 1985 to 7% in 1993, and the proportion who have no money to be hospitalized has increased from 13.4% to 24.5%. In poor mountainous areas, 72% of farmers are sick, and 89% of farmers are hospitalized because they cannot afford medical expenses (Wang, 200 1). Second, migrant workers go to cities. The significance of the bottom society is not only economic, but also social. Migrant workers are typical bottom groups created by both economic and social factors. From the early 1990s, rural surplus labor began to flock to cities. So far, the floating population from rural areas to cities has reached hundreds of millions [5]. From the whole society, hundreds of millions of migrant workers have become a social group with considerable scale, identity and social status. On the one hand, migrant workers working in cities not only play an important role in increasing the income of rural residents, but also in improving the quality of rural labor force. Some research reports show that rural youth think that the biggest gain of working in cities is to broaden their horizons and increase their knowledge. On the other hand, due to the existence of urban-rural dual structure, migrant workers entered the city as an unequal social identity from the beginning. For many of them, although they live and work in cities, they are not a member of urban society in terms of system. From a dynamic point of view, it is worth noting that when the "migrant workers' tide" just happened in the early 1990s, although a large number of migrant workers flooded into cities, they either did some jobs to fill vacancies in cities or engaged in marginal jobs that city people did not want to do. At that time, they were more like "temporary travelers" in the city. But today, more than ten years later, many "temporary passers-by" seem to have begun to settle in this city that does not belong to them. In some industries such as construction, they have become the main body of front-line workers. Those who are engaged in scavenging here have also settled down in this city with their families. However, despite this, the rigid household registration system still excludes them from the cities where they work and live. In this urban society, they are undoubtedly inferior. Quite a few of them have had the experience of being taken in and deported. Originally, according to the Measures for the Detention and Repatriation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars issued by the State Council 1982, the detention and repatriation work is mainly to rescue, educate and resettle urban vagrants and beggars. But in recent years, it has become a means for some urban departments to deal with migrant workers and even generate income. In the workplace, their basic rights are often not guaranteed. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: first, migrant workers are engaged in jobs that city people are unwilling to engage in. Poor working environment and low pay. In some areas, in recent 10 years, the nominal wages of migrant workers have not increased significantly, while the real wages have decreased. In 2000, there was an incident in Huizhou, Guangdong Province, where working for 500 hours a month made wage earners exhausted on the spot [6]. It is understood that the workers in this glove factory work overtime for a long time, and the average working time of each worker is more than 500 hours a month. But the minimum monthly wage of workers can only be around 300 yuan. Second, basic individual rights are not guaranteed. Third, wages are often in arrears. Third, the urban poor, mainly laid-off workers. Since 1990s, the unemployment and laid-off problems in China have become increasingly serious. In the city, losing your job means cutting off the basic source of life. Therefore, in recent years, a new poor class with laid-off workers as the main body has formed in our cities [7]. This is a phenomenon that has never happened before. Compared with farmers, this poor group has some unique characteristics. First, farmers still own a piece of land, and even if they lack cash income, they can solve the problem of eating by themselves. Residents in the city don't have this land, their cash income is cut off, and even eating may become a problem. 1000 laid-off workers in Beijing 1999 showed that the average personal income of workers decreased by 6 1. 15% before and after being laid off, especially for poor households. Second, widespread poverty is the basic environment for farmers to survive, without the stimulation of the gap between the rich and the poor in rural areas; In cities, the gap between the rich and the poor exists in a very distinct state, which has a strong stimulus to the poor groups in cities from time to time. Third, the cost of living in cities is high and inflexible. In the early and mid-1990s, prices and living expenses rose sharply. At the end of 1990s, although prices were relatively stable, a number of consumption items that originally belonged to social security but now need to be borne by themselves were added, such as housing, children's education expenses, part of medical expenses and old-age care. Because laid-off workers are mainly between the ages of 35 and 45, there are old and young, and wage income is the main source of family life. Once laid off, the whole family will fall into poverty. Fourth, under the condition that the unit still has strong welfare characteristics, losing work and income means losing a lot of benefits at the same time. The lower class is a phenomenon that will exist in any society. The key is to recognize the characteristics of the bottom-class society in a specific society so as to take correct countermeasures.